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"FINDING" A WAY TO COMPLETE THE RING
OF CAPITAL JURY SENTENCING
MARIA T. KOLARt
ABSTRACT
In the modem death penalty era in America, two findings have
emerged as generally required before a murderer can be sentenced to
death. First, the decisionmaker must find that the murder was especially
egregious, due to specific, statutorily-defined characteristics of the murder
or the murderer-typically referred to as "aggravating circumstances." Se-
cond, the decisionmaker must find that any aggravating circumstances in
the case "outweigh" any "mitigating circumstances," i.e., anything that
makes the crime or the defendant seem less deserving of death. Remarka-
bly, regarding the second finding (the weighing finding) it remains unclear
who "the decisionmaker" must be and how convinced the decisionmaker
must be-even though the Supreme Court held back in 2002, in Ring v.
Arizona, that the Sixth Amendment mandates that the decisionmaker for
the aggravating circumstance finding must be a jury and that the jury must
be convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt."
This Article asserts that Ring's use of the word "fact" to describe the
kind of determination that must be made by a jury has completely under-
mined the functional and elements-based approach of Ring. This approach,
properly understood, mandates that the Sixth Amendment jury require-
ment applies to any finding (not just "fact") that is required for a death
sentence. This Article traces the Court's use of the term "finding" in this
context-from the beginning of the modern death penalty era in 1976,
through Apprendi v. New Jersey in 2000, Ring in 2002, and Hurst v. Flor-
ida in 2016-and asserts that the Apprendi Court's use of the broader term
"finding" in this arena is more faithful to the Sixth Amendment and to
substantive state law. This Article catalogs how state supreme courts and
federal circuit courts overwhelmingly concluded (post-Ring) that the cap-
ital weighing finding is not subject to the Sixth Amendment, because it is
not a "fact" under Ring-aided by the Court's Eighth Amendment "death
eligibility" doctrine, which misleadingly suggests that defendants become
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"eligible" for a death sentence based solely on the finding of an aggravat-
ing circumstance.
The Court's broader approach in Hurst does provide some hope in
this realm and has led to momentous changes in Delaware, Florida, and
Alabama. And all but two states now insist that a jury make all the findings
that are required for a death sentence under state law. Nevertheless, while
nearly 75% of the current thirty-one death penalty states require a weigh-
ing-type finding for a valid death sentence, almost 75% of these states till
fail to require that this finding be made beyond a reasonable doubt, as the
Sixth Amendment mandates. There is still much work to be done.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 2002, in Ring v. Arizona,I the United States Supreme
Court announced, in a 7-2 decision and with six Justices on the majority
opinion, that the jury had a critical and required role to play in deciding
which convicted murderers could be sentenced to death.2 In particular, the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury includes the
right to have a jury, and not merely a judge, make the first finding that is
1. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
2. Id. at 587-89.
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required in every capital case before a defendant can potentially be sen-
tenced to death-namely, the finding that at least one statutorily-estab-
lished "aggravating circumstance" exists in the case.
Thus, beginning in 2002, states no longer had the option of entirely
removing the jury from the capital sentencing process, and capital defend-
ants in the United States have had the right to insist that a jury play a key
role in any death sentence. Furthermore, Ring established that this first
required jury finding, that at least one aggravating circumstance exists in
the case, must be made "beyond a reasonable doubt."A Consequently, after
Ring, no American defendant could be sent to death row without a jury
being thoroughly convinced that at least one aggravating circumstance (or
its functional equivalent) exists in the case, which makes that particular
murder or that particular murderer significantly "worse" than others.
Unfortunately, however, the Ring Court explicitly declined to decide
whether its holding applied to the second required finding of most capital
sentencing proceedings, i.e., the finding that any aggravating circum-
stances in a case "outweigh" the mitigating circumstances in the case. In
other words, Ring did not decide who the decisionmaker must be for this
weighing finding or how convinced the decisionmaker must be regarding
this second finding. Does the Sixth Amendment require that a jury make
this weighing finding or can it be made by a judge? And does the Sixth
Amendment require that the weighing finding (like the finding of an ag-
gravating circumstance) be made beyond a reasonable doubt? These issues
remain unresolved even today and are the focus of this Article.
The Ring decision was unusual and surprising in a number of im-
portant ways. First, even though it was a death penalty decision, it was
based upon the Sixth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment,
which had been the undisputed foundation of the Supreme Court's modem
death penalty jurisprudence.6 Second, the Ring pronouncement regarding
3. Id. at 609. In essence, "aggravating circumstances" are the facts about a particular murder
that make it especially egregious due to the manner in which it was committed, the criminal history of
the murderer, the vulnerability of the victim, the risk caused to others, the motivation for the killing,
etc. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12 (2016) (listing Oklahoma's "aggravating circumstances").
4. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 607-09 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477
(2000)); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003) (describing Ring as holding
"that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, and not a judge, find the existence of any aggravating
circumstances, and that they be found, not by a mere preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a
reasonable doubt") (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 608-09)).
5. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4. "Mitigating circumstances" can include anything about the
murder itself or the defendant's life, family history, limitations, positive qualities, etc., that could po-
tentially cause the decisionmaker to choose a sentence other than death. Mitigating evidence includes
evidence suggesting a lesser degree of culpability for the murder, but also anything that could cause
the decisionmaker to view the defendant more sympathetically or to give a sentence other than death.
See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113, 115 (1982) (discussing mitigating factors).
6. See discussion infra Part I. In Part I, this Article briefly summarizes Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), the 1972 Eighth Amendment decision that struck down the death
penalty as it then existed in America and set the stage for a new and entirely different "modem era"
of capital sentencing.
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the central role of the jury in capital sentencing was directly contrary to a
string of earlier cases in the modem era, which had repeatedly denied that
the jury had any necessary constitutional role in the capital sentencing pro-
COS7cess.7
The Ring decision was also surprising because in the very cases that
were its immediate predecessors and progenitors-the Supreme Court's
1999 decision in Jones v. United States8 and its 2000 decision in Apprendi
v. New Jersey9-the Court had insisted that these groundbreaking deci-
sions about the role of the jury in noncapital cases did not conflict with its
prior rulings that the jury did not have any required role to play in
death-penalty sentencing.'o
On the other hand, the underlying legal logic and rationale of both
Jones and Apprendi, when extended to the capital sentencing context,
seemed to compel the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does give cap-
ital defendants the right to insist that a jury make any findings that are
required for a sentence of death." And in 2002, the Ring Court agreed that
at least the first such finding in a capital case (the finding of at least one
statutorily-established aggravating circumstance) does indeed have to be
found by a jury, and it has to be found beyond a reasonable doubt.12 This
was a revolutionary result, and Ring seemed to portend a great expansion
in the concept of the constitutionally-required role of the jury in capital
-13sentencing.
Nevertheless, sixteen years later, the Court has gone no further, at
least in terms of its holdings, not even in 2016, when it struck down Flor-
ida's death penalty system for violating Ring, in Hurst v. Florida.14
7. See discussion infra Part II. In Part II, this Article briefly reviews the "Gregg cases," the
five 1976 Eighth Amendment cases that launched the modem era and established the key features that
have defined Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence ever since: the need to narrow the class of
murders subject to the death penalty and the need to allow consideration of the individual characteris-
tics of both the crime and the defendant within the capital sentencing process. Part II then focuses
upon the capital jury cases from the first twenty years of the modem era, during which the Court
recognized that a death sentence requires that multiple "findings" be made, but denied that the Con-
stitution mandated any role for the jury in this regard.
8. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
9. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
10. See, e.g., id. at 496-97 (reaffirming prior capital-case decisions).
11. See discussion infra Section III.A. In Section III.A., this Article analyzes the Court's non-
capital decisions in Jones and Apprendi and how their functional approach to the "elements" required
for a particular sentence logically led to the revolutionary capital sentencing holding of Ring. This
Article emphasizes, in particular, the broad language and approach of Apprendi, especially its use of
the generic term "finding" interchangeably with the term "fact" (and "finding of fact") when referring
to the determinations that must be made in order to sentence a defendant to death.
12. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602, 609 (2002) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477).
13. See discussion infra Section III.B. In Section III.B., this Article analyzes Ring, emphasizing
both its revolutionary result and impact, as well its potential limitations, especially its seemingly nar-
rower focus (compared to Apprendi) on "facts" and "factfinding."
14. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
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This Article asserts that the legal logic of Apprendi/Ring compels the
conclusion that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments together mandate
that the "weighing" finding that is required by most death penalty jurisdic-
tions-about whether the aggravating circumstances in a case "outweigh"
the mitigating circumstances in the case-must also be made by a jury and
that a jury must make this finding beyond a reasonable doubt. In other
words, this Article maintains that the Sixth Amendment rule of Ap-
prendi/Ring applies to the weighing finding.
Of the numerous state and federal jurisdictions that have addressed
this issue, however, precious few have reached this same conclusion. As
will be explained in detail, the "rule of Apprendi/Ring" is based upon a
functional analysis of a particular jurisdiction's requirements for a death
sentence, i.e., the "elements" of a death sentence. Under this functional
approach, if a particular finding is a required element for a death sentence,
it must be found by a jury and be found beyond a reasonable doubt. This
approach would seem to compel the conclusion that, at least for jurisdic-
tions that do require a weighing finding, this finding must also be made by
a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this has been a dis-
tinctly minority conclusion in this realm.15
The "failure" of the Ring revolution in this regard has been so pro-
nounced and disappointing (at least for some) that some scholars have ar-
gued that the Sixth Amendment itself has been a failure and that the Eighth
Amendment may provide a more viable avenue for appropriately recog-
nizing the jury as the primary decisionmaker in the capital context.16 Upon
reviewing the minimal impact of Ring, which they blame mainly on its
applicability only to "findings of fact,"' 7 Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau
propose that "the role of the jury in capital sentencing is best realized not
through the Sixth Amendment, but through the Eighth Amendment."'
8
15. See discussion infra Section III.C. In Section III.C., this Article reviews and analyzes how
the Ring revolution stalled and faltered during the years between Ring and Hurst regarding both its
impact on "hybrid" judge-jury capital sentencing schemes, see discussion infra Section III.C. ., and
its applicability to the weighing finding, see discussion infra Section III.C.3. In Section III.C.2., this
Article suggests that the Court's Eighth Amendment concept of "death eligibility" is a misnomer, at
least when taken too literally, which has contributed to an overly narrow interpretation of the proper
scope of Ring in the Sixth Amendment realm. See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
16. See, e.g., Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the Jury's
Role in Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 529-31 (2011). Kamin and Marceau argue
that although "Ring was initially seen, both by its proponents and its detractors, as a sea change in the
way states could structure their capital decision making[,]" this "apparent watershed decision has not
forced much change[] [because] [s]tate and federal courts'continue to take a crabbed reading of exactly
what constitutes fact finding" under Ring. Id at 529, 581. Kamin and Marceau maintain that the basic
problem is that Ring, by its terms, is limited to findings of "fact"; and they blame this limitation for
the ease with which the force of Ring's functional analysis has been avoided by courts seeking to limit
its impact. See id. at 582-83 ("Unless a sentencing decision can be described as fact finding, it simply
falls outside the Apprendi-Ring purview.").
17. See id. at 580 ("Ring requires a jury only when the decision at issue hinges on a finding of
fact. . . .").
18. Id. at 531.
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They maintain that the Eighth Amendment (at least as understood by Jus-
tices Stevens and Breyer) can "better effectuate[] the jury-right promise of
the Sixth Amendment than does the Sixth Amendment itself." 19
This Article rejects the suggestion that the Sixth Amendment Ring
approach to capital jury sentencing is doomed or inadequate (though it
certainly has been slow). This Article asserts that the main culprit for the
shortfalls of the Ring revolution is the Ring Court's use of the word "fact"
in its opinion (along with "factfinding" and "findings of fact"). While the
word "fact" and a decidedly narrow, nonfunctional approach to this word
have indeed been the main cause of Ring's minimal impact-with some
help from the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment concept of being
"death eligible" (which is also troubling and potentially misleading in this
realm)-this Article maintains that there is another word that can poten-
tially "save the day" or at least help bring the Ring revolution to its logical
and constitutionally appropriate conclusion. And the word is "finding."
This Article undertakes a careful, textual analysis of the Apprendi
decision, upon which Ring is explicitly based, and asserts that the Ap-
prendi Court used the broader term "finding" interchangeably with the
seemingly more narrow terms "fact" and "finding of fact" to describe the
type of determination that is covered by its functional rule.20 This Article
emphasizes that although the Ring opinion and holding focus upon the
terms "fact" and "factfinding," a narrow understanding of these terms is
entirely inconsistent with Ring's roots in Apprendi and, more importantly,
with the explicitly functional nature of the analysis mandated by both.
This Article recognizes that although the Court's 2016 decision in
Hurst did strike down Florida's death penalty system for violating Ring, it
did not explicitly change or expand the rule of Ring.21 On the other hand,
Justice Sotomayor's Hurst opinion returned to a much broader "find-
ing"-based Sixth Amendment approach (like that ofApprendi), which may
herald a future fulfillment of the Ring revolution by applying its ele-
ments-based rule to all required capital findings, including the weighing
finding.22 Decisions by the Supreme Courts of Florida and Delaware have
already recognized Hurst's broader vision and approach and have applied
19. Id. at 531-32; see also Jeffrey Wermer, Comment, The Jury Requirement in Death Sentenc-
ing After Hurst v. Florida, 94 DENW. L. REV. 385, 410, 411 (2017) (proposing that due to the "fact-
finding" limitations of the Sixth Amendment's Ring approach, even post-Hurst, "Eighth Amendment
capital jurisprudence should . . . be brought to bear to protect a criminal defendant from being sen-
tenced to death by ajudge's determination"); id. at 400 (lamenting that "[lt]he effects of Ring and Hurst
depend on what exactly a 'fact' is with regard to capital sentencing").
20. And in Apprendi's application of its new rule to the facts of that case, it consistently de-
scribed its analysis as applying to "the required 'motive' finding" and the finding of biased purpose
without ever concluding that such "findings" constituted "facts" or "factfinding." Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494-95 (2000) (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (1999), rev'd, 530
U.S. 466).
21. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
22. See discussion infra Section IV.A. In Section IV.A., this Article analyzes Hurst and its
broader "finding"-based vision of the jury's necessary Sixth Amendment role in capital sentencing.
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Hurst expansively within their jurisdictions (at least prospectively). On the
other hand, it remains to be seen whether the numerous capital jurisdic-
tions that already require a weighing-type finding will likewise recognize
that under the Sixth Amendment rule of Apprendi/Ring/Hurst, such find-
ings must be made by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt.2 3
I. FURMAN V. GEORGIA AND THE END OF ABSOLUTE JURY DISCRETION
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,24 the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, struck down the death penalty as it existed at the time for violat-
ing the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punish-
ment[] .25 In the years leading up to Furman, death penalty sentencing in
America was entirely jury determined, with the decision about whether to
sentence a particular defendant (who had been convicted of a capital of-
fense) to death or to some term of imprisonment left entirely to the un-
guided discretion of the jury.26 Interestingly, such discretionary jury sen-
tencing had previously been seen as a significant and progressive sentenc-
ing reform in America, since it was preceded-from colonial times until
late in the nineteenth century-by a protracted age of mandatory capital
sentencing, in which a death sentence followed automatically from a con-
viction for a remarkably wide range of crimes.27 This positive understand-
ing of discretionary capital sentencing had begun to come under sharp at-
tack, however, in the years leading up to Furman, based upon a growing
perception that the death penalty was being imposed not for the worst
crimes or upon the worst criminals, but arbitrarily and often due to racial
- 28,animus.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's 1972 landmark decision in Fur-
man, striking down the death penalty as it was then being used, came as a
huge shock.29 In addition, the basis for the Supreme Court's decision was
not easy to discern because the Furman decision resulted in a very brief
per curiam holding, followed by nine separate opinions, one for every Jus-
tice on the Court, and with no Justices in the majority joining the opinion
of anyone else, i.e., no plurality opinion, let alone a majority opinion.30
23. See discussion infra Section IV.B. In Section IV.B., this Article summarizes the impact of
Hurst among the states that had judge-jury capital sentencing at the time of Hurst (especially Dela-
ware, Florida, and Alabama) and analyzes the death penalty statutes of all thirty-one current death
penalty states regarding the potential applicability of Ring/Hurst to the weighing-type findings that
are required by the vast majority of these states.
24. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
25. Id. at 239-40; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
26. CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 43 (2016) ("By the 1960s, every capital jurisdiction afforded absolute discre-
tion to jurors to impose or withhold the death penalty.").
27. Id. at 9-12.
28. Id. at 44.
29. Id. at 60 ("National and state leaders greeted Furman with vehement objection.").
30. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam); id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 375-405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
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Yet among the opinions of the Furman majority Justices, the completely
discretionary nature of capital sentencing as of 1972 appeared to be its
main downfall. Whereas Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the
death penalty itself violated the Eighth Amendment, ' Justices Stewart and
White focused upon the unpredictable and seemingly capricious nature of
capital sentencing decisions at the time, in which death sentences were
quite rare overall, but also seemingly random.3 2 Justice Douglas empha-
sized, in particular, the profound potential for (and apparent reality of) vast
racial discrimination within this entirely discretionary process.
After Furman, it was not entirely clear whether the death penalty in
America was gone for good or just needed to be reformulated. Jurisdic-
tions that wanted to continue to use- the death penalty scrambled to come
up with a system that would pass constitutional muster, i.e., be upheld by
the Supreme Court, and the main focus of these efforts was to come up
with a system of "guided discretion."34 During the four short years after
Furman, a remarkable thirty-five states and the U.S. Congress passed new
death penalty statutes.35 The death penalty in America was not going down
without a fight.
I.THE CAPITAL JURY IN THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF THE
MODERN ERA: COMMON, BUT NOT REQUIRED
On July 2, 1976, on the brink of the 200th anniversary of the signing
of the Declaration of Independence, the Supreme Court issued its decisions
in five separate cases regarding the constitutionality of the capital punish-
ment systems adopted in Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and
Louisiana.36 The Supreme Court's "modem" death penalty jurisprudence
can be described as beginning on this day when the Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the capital sentencing schemes of Georgia, Florida,
405-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); id at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
31. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
32. See, e.g., id at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These death sentences are cruel and unu-
sual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."); id. at 310 (describing the
American death penalty as "wantonly and ... freakishly imposed"); id at 313 (White, J., concurring)
(concluding that "the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious
crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not").
33. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitu-
tional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unu-
sual' punishments.").
34. See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 26, at 61 ("The distinctive feature of all the new statutes
was an effort to limit the discretion characteristic of death penalty schemes before Furman.").
35. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (plurality opinion).
36. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Car-
olina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
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and Texas (and struck down the systems of North Carolina and Louisi-
ana). For present purposes, two key themes came out of these cases. First,
capital systems must specifically narrow the class of offenses for which
the death penalty can be given in order to limit discretion. This theme came
out of the cases affirming the death penalty schemes of Georgia, Florida,
and Texas, especially Gregg v. Georgia.3 8 Second, capital systems must
allow for individual consideration of the specific crime and criminal at
issue, including the character and record of that defendant. This theme
emerged in the cases striking down the mandatory death penalty schemes
of North Carolina and Louisiana, particularly the decision in Woodson v.
North Carolina.39
By and large, the "narrowing" requirement has been implemented
through the use of either guilt-stage "aggravated murder" crimes or sen-
tencing-stage "aggravating circumstances," both of which specifically
limit the murders to which the death penalty can be applied.40 And the
"individualized consideration" requirement has been implemented by in-
sisting that death penalty jurisdictions allow consideration of any mitigat-
ing evidence or "mitigating circumstances" that the defendant chooses to
offer as a basis for a sentence less than death.4 1
While the 1976 "Gregg cases" focused on how the death penalty de-
cision must be made, they mostly paid little attention to who was actually
making this decision and whether the jury was required. In fact, during the
first twenty years of the modem era, the Court consistently declined to find
that the jury had any central or constitutionally-required role in capital
sentencing, often with quite limited and conclusory analysis of the issue.
Instead, the Court repeatedly chose to allow the states great freedom in
their decisions about how to use the jury in the realm of capital sentencing,
including. not at all.
37. While Furman could also be described as the beginning of this "modem era," the return of
the death penalty to the United States in 1976, in significantly changed form, is also a plausible place
to mark the start of this new era.
38. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171-72, 189 ("Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbi-
trary and capricious action.").
39. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 ("[T]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death." (citation omitted)).
40. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ("[A]n aggravating circumstance must
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.");
see also Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988) ("We see no reason why this narrowing
function may not be performed by jury findings at either the sentencing phrase of the trial or the guilt
phase.").
41. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) ("[A] death penalty statute must not
preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors."); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
112 (1982) ("[T]he sentencer in [a] capital case[] must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating
factor. . . .").
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Proffitt v. Florida42 was one of the five Gregg cases that marked the
beginning of the modem era and was the Court's first post-Furman con-
sideration of a capital system in which a jury was not the key death penalty
decisionmaker.43 Although Florida had not entirely removed the jury from
the capital sentencing process, it subjugated the jury to the trial judge, who
served as the actual decisionmaker regarding both the required findings
and the ultimate sentencing decision.4 4 Although the challenges to Flor-
ida's capital system were not Sixth Amendment challenges,4 5 the Proffitt
Court's statements about the role of the jury set the stage for the Court's
resolution of jury-focused claims in later cases.
The Florida system provided that, after a defendant was convicted by
a jury of first-degree murder, a separate evidentiary hearing would be held
before the same judge and jury to determine whether the defendant would
be sentenced to life imprisonment or to the death penalty.4 6 Evidence could
be presented by both the prosecution and the defense regarding "aggravat-
ing circumstances" and "mitigating circumstances," as defined by Florida
law, and about whether the defendant should be sentenced to death.47 The
jury was not asked to make any specific findings, but was directed to con-
sider "[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist. . . which out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist," and then make a sen-
tencing recommendation, life or death, which was based on a majority vote
and was only advisory.48
In order to actually sentence a defendant to death, the trial judge was
required to set forth in writing: (1) which of Florida's statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances existed in the case, and (2) whether the mitigating cir-
cumstances in the case were "insufficient ... to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances."49 The trial court could only sentence a defendant to death
if it made both of these two findings.50
42. 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
43. See id. at 246. The Proffitt decision, upholding Florida's new capital sentencing scheme,
was decided by a vote of 7-2 with only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 244,
260-61. The plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 244-60,
is generally regarded as articulating the "authoritative rationale" for the Court's holding. Bryan A.
Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the Jury in
Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2003).
44. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251.
45. Id. at 244 ("The issue presented by this case is whether the imposition of the sentence of
death for the crime of murder under the law of Florida violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.").
46. Id at 247-48.
47. Id. at 248 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(b)-(c) (1976) (amended 2017)).
48. Id. at 248-49 (quoting § 921.141(2)(b)-(c)).
49. Id. at 250 (quoting § 921.141(3)(a)-(b)).
50. Id. The Florida capital sentencing procedure upheld in Proffitt in 1976 was fundamentally
and structurally the same as the Florida procedure struck down almost forty years later in Hurst, based
upon the Court's 2016 conclusion that the Sixth Amendment "require[s] Florida to base ... [a] death
sentence on a jury's verdict, not ajudge's factfinding." Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016).
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The Proffitt Court recognized that in Florida "the actual [death] sen-
tence is determined by the trial judge,"' while the jury's role "is only ad-
visory."52 The Proffitt Court's analysis of the potential constitutional sig-
nificance of Florida's subjugation of the jury's role, however, was remark-
ably brief: "This Court has pointed out that jury sentencing in a capital
case can perform an important societalfunction, v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
519 n. 15 (1968), but it has never suggested that jury sentencing is consti-
tutionally required."53 And that was the entirety of Proffitt's analysis re-
garding whether ajury is constitutionally required for sentencing a defend-
ant to death, i.e., a notation that the Court has "never suggested" that ajury
is "constitutionally required," which, in turn, served as a strong suggestion
that it is not.
Exactly eight years later, on July 2, 1984, in Spaziano v. Florida,5 4
the Supreme Court took up this issue directly and made its big "wrong
turn" on the issue of capital jury sentencing-a turn that the Court majority
would not seriously question or attempt to right until Ring in 2002. The
Court made this wrong turn by allowing the states unconstrained flexibility
to choose who would be the death penalty decisionmaker, even while im-
posing many other limitations on how the death penalty decision could be
made, as well as the evidence that must be admitted regarding this deci-
*55sion.
The Spaziano case involved a challenge to the same Florida capital
sentencing scheme addressed in Proffitt.5 6 In Spaziano, after convicting
the defendant of murder, the jury recommended a sentence of imprison-
ment for life.57 The trial judge, however, reached a different conclusion,
finding, "notwithstanding the recommendation of the jury," (1) that two
specific statutory aggravating circumstances existed in the case, (2) that
"the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh such aggra-
vating circumstances," and (3) that "a sentence of death should be imposed
in this case."5 8
51. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 249.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 252 (citation omitted) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n. 15 (1968)).
The Proffitt Court's citation to its pre-Furman (i.e., pre-"modern era") capital decision in Witherspoon
is quite striking here because the Witherspoon Court did envision a critical and important role for the
jury in the capital sentencing process. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) ("[A] jury
that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more-and must do
nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death.").
54. 468 U.S. 447 (1984), overruled by Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616.
55. Id. at 462, 464.
56. See id at 449.
57. Id. at 451.
58. Id. at 451-52 (quoting the trial court).
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This "judge trumps jury" result is often described as a "judicial over-
ride,"59 and defendant Spaziano challenged the judicial override in his
case.60 In particular, he challenged it under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.6 1 The Court noted that it could have limited its
decision to whether Florida's judicial-override system was constitutional,
but it ultimately chose to speak more broadly about whether the jury had
any necessary constitutional role in the choice about whether to sentence
a defendant to death.62 And the Spaziano Court spoke very broadly indeed:
In light of the facts that the Sixth Amendment does not require jury
sentencing, that the demands of fairness and reliability in capital cases
do not require it, and that neither the nature of, nor the purpose behind,
the death penalty requires jury sentencing, we cannot conclude that
placing responsibility on the trial judge to impose the sentence in a
capital case is unconstitutional.63
Regarding the Sixth Amendment, the Spaziano Court defaulted to the
same (weak) conclusion it had invoked in Proffitt, namely, that "[t]he
Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury
determination" regarding "the appropriate punishment to be imposed on
an individual."64 And regarding the Eighth Amendment, the Court quickly
dispatched the "because death is different" argument for requiring a jury
to sentence a defendant to death.65
When Florida's capital sentencing scheme was yet again challenged
five years later in Hildwin v. Florida,6 6 the focus was on the Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury sentencing.67 The Hildwin petitioner asserted that Flor-
ida's system violated the Sixth Amendment because it allowed a defendant
59. See id. at 463 (referring to states that "allow[] a judge to override a jury's recommendation
of life"); see also Ryan Lovelace, Alabama Knocks Down Judicial Override in Death Penalty Cases,
WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 12, 2017, 11:44 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/alabama-
knocks-down-judicial-override-in-death-penalty-cases; Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Lets Alabama
Judges Impose Death Penalty, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/23/supreme-court-alabama-florida-death-penalty-judge-
jury/96947280.
60. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 457.
61. Id. at 457-58.
62. See id at 458, 464. The Court noted that it "need not decide whether jury sentencing in all
capital cases is required," because the case presented "only the question whether, given a jury verdict
of life, the judge may override that verdict and impose death." Id at 458. The Court further noted,
however, that defense counsel had "acknowledged at oral argument . .. [that] his fundamental premise
is that the capital sentencing decision is one that, in all cases, should be made by a jury." Id. Hence
the Court concluded: "We therefore address that fundamental premise." Id.
63. Id. at 464.
64. Id. at 459.
65. See id at 460 ("[T]here certainly is nothing in the safeguards necessitated by the Court's
recognition of the qualitative difference of the death penalty that requires that the sentence be imposed
by a jury.").
66. 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
67. Id. at 638. There was no judicial override issue in Hildwin because thejury had unanimously
recommended a death sentence, and the trial court agreed. Id at 639.
682 [Vol. 95:3
2018] "FINDING" A WAY TO COMPLETE THE RING
to be sentenced to death "without a specific finding by [a] jury that suffi-
cient aggravating circumstances exist to qualify the defendant for capital
punishment."68 This argument was unlike any that had been made or ad-
dressed in Spaziano.69 Nevertheless, the Hildwin Court rejected it in a per
curiam opinion, noting that in Spaziano it had "upheld against Sixth
Amendment challenge the trial judge's imposition of a sentence of death
notwithstanding that the jury had recommended a sentence of life impris-
onment."70 The Court added: "If the Sixth Amendment permits a judge to
impose a sentence of death when the jury recommends life imprison-
ment, . . . it follows that it does not forbid the judge to make the written
findings that authorize imposition of a death sentence when the jury unan-
imously recommends [death]."
The Hildwin Court maintained that "the existence of an aggravating
factor here is not an element of the offense but instead is 'a sentencing
factor that comes into play only after the defendant has been found
guilty."' 72 This assertion is, in a nutshell, precisely the same argument that
would be made by the State of Arizona (and rejected by the Court) thirteen
years later in Ring. Nevertheless, the above conclusory sentence was all
that was offered to justify the Hildwin Court's rejection of this Sixth
Amendment challenge. The Hildwin Court declared, "Accordingly, the
Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing
the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury." 74
When this same issue came before the Court again just one year later
in Walton v. Arizona,75 the Court again quickly disposed of it.76 The Ari-
zona capital system considered in Walton, unlike the Florida system, was
entirely judge based.77 The death penalty sentencing hearing was con-
ducted "before the court alone,"7 and the judge would determine whether
any of Arizona's statutory aggravating circumstances existed, whether any
mitigating circumstances existed, and whether any "mitigating circum-
stances [were] sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."7 9 As in
68. Id.
69. It was also the argument that later prevailed in Ring. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,
607, 609 (2002).
70. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 639-40.
71. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 641 (quoting McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)).
73. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
74. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the Hildwin Court
here and otherwise (including supra) referred to the determinations that must be made before a de-
fendant could be sentenced to death as "findings," though the Court emphatically declined to require
that these findings be made by a jury. See id
75. 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
76. Id. at 647-49, 655.
77. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (1989) (current version at §§ 13-751 to -752
(2017)).
78. Walton, 497 U.S. at 643 (quoting § 13-703(B)).
79. Id. at 643-44 (quoting § 13-703(E)).
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Hildwin, the petitioner challenged this system under the Sixth Amend-
ment, arguing that "every finding of fact underlying the sentencing deci-
sion must be made by a jury, not by a judge."8 0
The Walton Court's response was both summary and unflinching:
"Any argument that he Constitution requires that a jury impose the sen-
tence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a
sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court."8' And
the Court quoted Hildwin's conclusion that "the Sixth Amendment does
not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sen-
tence of death be made by the jury." 82
The Walton opinion reveals that the Court clearly understood the
overall import of the defendant's claims in that case, namely, that if either
the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment mandate that the "find-
ings" that are required for a death sentence be made by a jury, this jury
mandate would apply to all required capital "findings."8 3 And the Walton
Court, like the Hildwin Court, repeatedly referred to the "findings"-in
the plural-that were required for a death sentence, under the laws of the
jurisdictions at issue.84 These decisions recognized that if the Constitution
mandates that any required capital findings (such as the existence of an
aggravator) have to be made by a jury, then it would logically follow that
all death-sentence-required "findings" have to be made by a jury (includ-
ing, for example, any finding regarding the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances or whether mitigating circumstances are "suffi-
ciently substantial to call for leniency"). Although Walton and.Hildwin
rejected the claim that aggravating circumstances are required "elements"
of a capital offense, they recognized what was at stake and the profound
significance of starting down this path.
And by 1995, the Court seemed to have reached overwhelming con-
sensus in its resolution not to go down this path. In Harris v. Alabama,
in an opinion that garnered the assent of eight of the nine Justices on the
Court, the Court rejected a claim that Alabama's hybrid "judge-jury" cap-
ital sentencing statute was unconstitutional because it did not specify the
weight that the trial judge had to give to the jury's sentencing recommen-
dation.86 Considering that in Walton the Court had upheld a capital sen-
tencing scheme with no jury involvement at all, this result seems unsur-
prising. It is worth noting, however, that this time there was only one dis-
senter, Justice Stevens, who articulated a powerful argument for the role
of the jury in all capital sentencing proceedings.87 Yet because both Justice
80. Id. at 647.
81. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990)).
82. Id. (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per curiam)).
83. See id. at 647-49.
84. See id at 647-48.
85. 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
86. Id. at 504, 512.
87. See id at 515-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Brennan and Justice Marshall had left the Court since Walton-and no
other Justice had joined the Stevens camp-he dissented alone.
The near-unanimity of the Harris opinion, as well as the unblinking
nature of the final paragraph, are both rather striking. The opinion con-
cludes, with nary a citation to authority nor a caveat, as follows: "The Con-
stitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence.
It is not offended when a State further requires the sentencing judge to
consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper
weight."8 8
As of 1995, any argument that the American jury had any required
constitutional role-beyond finding the defendant guilty of murder-in a
decision about whether a convicted murderer could be or should be sen-
tenced to death seemed to be effectively over. It appeared that the Court
would allow death penalty states complete freedom to choose who would
be the decisionmaker regarding any required "findings" in a capital sen-
tencing proceeding, including findings about aggravating circumstances,
findings about whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances, and the ultimate finding about whether the defendant
should be sentenced to prison or to death. It appeared that the Court was
quite comfortable that the Constitution permitted a trial judge, a jury, or
any combination of the two to make any and all of these decisions. Neither
the Sixth Amendment, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor the Fourteenth
Amendment appeared to provide any restrictions on state discretion in this
regard; and the Supreme Court appeared quite content with this result.
But revolutions are often hard to predict. And the Supreme Court's
capital jury sentencing revolution was actually not far off.
III. THE CAPITAL JURY IN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS:
REQUIRED, BUT TO WHAT EXTENT?
A. The Unlikely Beginning of the Capital Jury Revolution
Death penalty cases are overwhelmingly state court cases, and (in the
modem era) they are always murder cases.89 Nevertheless, the case that
began the capital jury sentencing revolution was not a capital case, nor was
it a murder case or a state court case. The revolution began with Jones v.
88. Id. at 515 (majority opinion).
89. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S 407, 413 (2008) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the death penalty as punishment for rape of child where crime does not result in death of
victim), modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty as punishment for crime of
rape of an adult woman). These cases are generally understood to mean that the death penalty is only
allowed for murder. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437 (concluding that for "crimes against individual
persons," the death penalty can only be given in cases where a life has been taken).
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United States, which was nominally a case about the statutory interpreta-
tion of the federal carjacking statute.90 Although Jones seemed to poten-
tially herald a sentencing revolution in general, it did not appear to be one
that would affect capital sentencing.9 1
The federal carjacking statute established three different punishment
ranges for carjacking: up to fifteen years for the basic carjacking offense,
up to twenty-five years if the carjacking resulted in "serious bodily injury,"
and up to life imprisonment if the carjacking resulted in a death.9 2 The
Jones petitioner was indicted and convicted at a jury trial of carjacking
based simply upon the elements of the basic offense.9 3 At his later sentenc-
ing before the district court, however, the state presented evidence that the
offense involved "serious bodily injury." 94 The district court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that this was true (over defense objection
that this had not been charged or proven to the jury) and then sentenced
the petitioner to imprisonment for twenty-five years on the carjacking
count.95
The Jones majority described the case as turning on "whether the fed-
eral carjacking statute . . . defined three distinct offenses or a single crime
with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them dependent on sen-
tencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge and jury ver-
dict." 96 The Court concluded that "the better reading is of three distinct
offenses, particularly in light of the rule that any interpretive uncertainty
should be resolved to avoid serious questions about the statute's constitu-
tionality." 9 7 The 5-4 Jones decision revealed a deeply divided Court, and
the real fight was not nearly so much about the best interpretation of the
federal carjacking statute, but rather about whether the case raised "serious
constitutional questions."98
The Court emphasized that the key question was whether the "serious
bodily injury" provision was "an element of an offense rather than a sen-
tencing consideration, given that elements must be charged in the indict-
ment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."99 And even the dissenters agreed that he issue at stake
was whether the provisions establishing higher penalties for a carjacking
90. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999). The Jones decision was about 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (1988), as of the time the petitioner was charged. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229-30; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (1988) (amended 1996).
91. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 254 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Departing from this recent authority,
the Court's sweeping constitutional discussion casts doubt on sentencing practices and assumptions
followed not only in the federal system but also in many States.").
92. Id. at 230 (majority opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119).
93. Id. at 230-31.
94. Id. at231.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 229.
97. Id
98. Id at 251.
99. Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
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that resulted in "serious bodily injury" or "death" created new and separate
offenses (for which these provisions were required "elements") or merely
"sentencing considerations" of a single carjacking offense.00
The Jones majority and the dissenters disagreed vehemently over the
proper test for determining whether something is an "element." The ma-
jority's test-which proposed a bold new rule-was as follows:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the no-
tice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other
than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to ajury, and proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.101
The majority conceded that "our prior cases suggest rather than establish
this principle" and thus that the government's proposed interpretation of
the carjacking statute raised an issue of constitutional "doubt," rather than
a clear violation.' 02
While the majority recognized the plausibility of the dissent's single-
offense interpretation of the carjacking statute,103 it maintained that its
reading of the statute should be preferred because it avoided the "grave
and doubtful constitutional questions" that would be raised by the dissent's
approach.10 4 The majority maintained that allowing an increase in the de-
fendant's maximum possible sentence-from fifteen years to twenty-five
years to life-based upon a "preponderance of the evidence" finding by
the court at sentencing (about the results of the carjacking), rather than a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" finding by the jury at trial, raised troubling
constitutional issues regarding the appropriate role of the jury.'0
The Jones dissenters warned, however, that the majority's proposed
approach actually caused constitutional doubt regarding the Court's capi-
tal sentencing cases, asserting, "If it is constitutionally impermissible to
allow a judge's finding to increase the maximum punishment for carjack-
ing by [ten] years, it is not clear why a judge's finding may increase the
maximum punishment for murder from imprisonment to death."'06 The
dissent warned: "Reexamination of this area of our capital jurisprudence
100. See id. at 254-55, 269 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that if something qualifies as an
"element" of an offense, this implies the constitutional requirements of being included in an indictment
and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
101. Id. at 243 n.6 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
102. Id
103. Id at 238-39.
104. Id at 239-40 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366, 408 (1909)).
105. Id. at 242-44.
106. Id at 271-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy's dissent added
that "Walton [v. Arizona] would appear to have been a better candidate for the Court's new approach
than is the instant case." Id. at 272. It should also be noted here that Kennedy's dissent used the term
"finding" to refer to the kind of required capital sentencing determination that was at issue. See id
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can be expected."107 Thus the Jones dissenters predicted the Court's even-
tual conclusion in Ring, even while the Jones majority denied that its new
approach raised any such conflict and even before the majority's new ap-
proach had been actually adopted as the law of the land.'08
Just one year later in 2000, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court's
new approach became the law of the land, launching a broad and general
sentencing revolution in earnest.io, Once again, the vote was 5-4, with the
same Justices in the majority and dissenting as in Jones (though the Court
was even more deeply divided),"10 and with the majority continuing to
deny that its bold, new approach to sentencing in general had any implica-
tions for capital sentencing.'
The question before the Court was the constitutionality of a New Jer-
sey "hate crime" statute, which provided for an increased maximum term
of imprisonment if a trial judge found at sentencing (by a "preponderance
of the evidence") that the crime at issue was committed "with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group .. .because of race, color, gender, hand-
icap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity."l l2 In Apprendi, the relevant
underlying offense (to which the defendant pleaded guilty) was for se-
cond-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which had a
sentencing range of five to ten years.' 13 Even though the defendant's in-
dictment did not mention the hate crime statute or allege that he had acted
with a biased purpose, after the defendant pleaded guilty, the prosecutor
requested that his punishment on a particular second-degree possession of
a firearm count be "enhanced" based on the hate crime statute."14 After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial judge ruled that the New Jersey hate crime
enhancement applied because the offense at issue was "motivated by racial
bias," which increased the potential sentence on that particular count to a
range of ten to twenty years.'
107. Id
108. See id. at 250-51 (majority opinion) (denying the relevance of Spaziano, Hildwin, and Wal-
ton to the Sixth Amendment analysis and approach relied upon in Jones).
109. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 524 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Today,
in what will surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law, the Court imposes as
a constitutional rule the principle it first identified in Jones.").
110. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Apprendi, which was joined by Justices Scalia,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 468 (majority opinion). Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opin-
ion, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Id. at 523 (O'Con-
nor, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring), and Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, which was joined in part by Scalia, id. at 499
(Thomas, J., concurring). And Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 496-97.
112. Id. at 468-69 (majority opinion) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1997)
(amended 2001)).
113. Id. at 469-70.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 470-71. The trial judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the sentencing
enhancement applied-and that it was constitutional-and then sentenced the defendant to imprison-
ment for twelve years on the enhanced count. Id. at 471.
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The Apprendi majority framed the issue before the Court as follows:
"The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an in-
crease in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from [ten] to
[twenty] years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.""16 The Court noted that it had "foreshadowed" its answer to this
question in Jones and that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment commands the
same answer in this case involving a state statute."17
The Apprendi Court emphasized the "surpassing importance" of the
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial and concluded that "[lt]aken together, these rights indis-
putably entitle a criminal defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is
guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt.""'8 After discussing the common law tradition regard-
ing the rights to jury trial and due process, the early American understand-
ing of these rights, and the Court's own case law regarding these rights,"19
the Apprendi majority formally adopted the rule it had foretold in Jones:
"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the pen-
alty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be sub-
mitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 2 0 The Apprendi
majority described this principle as "the constitutional rule that emerges
from our history and our case law."1 21
The Court's approach in Apprendi was an adamantly functional one,
rather than a formalistic one, regarding how its new rule should be applied.
The Apprendi Court emphasized that in determining whether a particular
"required finding" is an "element" that must be proven to a jury or a "sen-
tencing factor" that could be found by a judge, "[1]abels do not afford an
acceptable answer." 2 2 The Court also noted that the location of a particu-
lar statute within a jurisdiction's statutory scheme was likewise not deci-
sive and, in particular, that "the mere presence of this 'enhancement' in a
sentencing statute does not define its character."23
Instead, the Court emphasized that the determinative issue was the
effect of the finding at issue: "[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form,
but of effect-does the requiredfinding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" 24 And the
Court found constitutional significance in the change in the defendant's
116. Id. at 469.
117. Id.at476.
118. Id. at 476-77 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,
510 (1995)).
119. See id at 476-90.
120. Id. at 490.
121. Id. at 492.
122. Id. at 494 (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (N.J. 1999)).
123. Id. at 495-96.
124. Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
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maximum sentence (from ten years to twenty years): "Both in terms of
absolute years behind bars, and because of the more severe stigma at-
tached, the differential here is unquestionably of constitutional signifi-
cance."1 25 The Court declared: "When a judge's finding based on a mere
preponderance of the evidence authorizes an increase in the maximum
punishment, it is appropriately characterized as 'a tail which wags the dog
of the substantive offense."'
1 26
It should be noted that the Apprendi Court here repeatedly used the
word "finding" to refer to a determination that, under the Court's new rule,
must be made by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of its
label or characterization by the jurisdiction at issue, if the effect of the
determination is to increase the maximum possible sentence on the under-
lying count.127 Although the Apprendi opinion also used the term "fact" to
refer to such determinations,128 which is arguably narrower and more lim-
ited than the term "finding," a careful reading of the opinion reveals that
the Court did not intend its use of the term "fact" in its various assertions
of this new rule to be read narrowly or to have any different meaning than
the term "finding," which it used repeatedly and interchangeably with the
term "fact" in this context.
For example, the Apprendi Court noted that the defendant's argument
on appeal was that due process "requires that the finding of bias upon
which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt." 29 And the Court noted that in Jones it had "expressed
serious doubt concerning the constitutionality of allowing penalty-enhanc-
ing findings to be determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."1 30
Furthermore, the Apprendi Court consistently used the term "find-
ing," rather than "fact" or even "factual finding," when referring to the
specific determination that was at issue in the case before the Court:
whether the defendant had acted with a "purpose to intimidate" based upon
race.131 This is understandable because it sounds somewhat strange to call
this type of purpose or mental state a "fact." 1 32 The Apprendi Court noted
that the challenged New Jersey scheme allowed a defendant to be con-
victed at trial based upon a jury's "finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
he unlawfully possessed a prohibited weapon" (a second-degree offense),
but then allowed a judge to impose a sentence identical to that of a greater
125. Id. at 495.
126. Id (emphasis added) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
127. See id. at 474, 494-95.
128. See supra text accompanying note 120.
129. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
130. Id. at 472 (citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999)).
131. See id at 471-74, 491-95.
132. Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court dissent in the case below, which the Apprendi ma-
jority quoted from, likewise used the word "finding" to refer to the determination at issue. See id at
473-74 (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 498 (N.J. 1999) (Stein, J., dissenting)).
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(first-degree) offense "based upon the judge's finding, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the defendant's 'purpose' for unlawfully possessing
the weapon was 'to intimidate' his victim on the basis of a particular char-
acteristic the victim possessed."'33 The Court also noted that in the current
case, "it does not matter whether the required finding is characterized as
one of intent or of motive,"' 34 still referring to this determination as in-
volving a "finding" (rather than a "fact" or a "finding of fact"). 3 5
Yet despite the Apprendi opinion's emphasis on the broad and func-
tional nature of its new rule-that any "finding" that, by law, effectively
increases a defendant's maximum sentence is actually an "element" of a
greater offense that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt-
the majority maintained that its new rule did not undermine its capital
cases, such as Walton, allowing judges (rather than juries) "to find specific
aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death."3 6 The Apprendi
majority suggested (briefly and unconvincingly) that the capital sentenc-
ing context was different and that its new rule would not apply there any-
way because "once ajury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements
of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death,
it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather
than a lesser one, ought to be imposed."'3 7 This proffered distinction was
both inaccurate (because a jury conviction of murder does not, without
further findings, actually expose a defendant to a death sentence) and con-
trary to the Court's own consistent recognition of the nature of capital sen-
tencing in America in the modem era.138
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, was extensive, vigor-
ous, and quite hard hitting.'3 9 The four dissenting Justices disagreed vig-
orously with the majority on numerous issues and predicted extensive
133. Id. at 491 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 1999) (amended 2013)). The
Court concluded, "In light of the constitutional rule explained above, and all of the cases upporting
it, this practice cannot stand." Id. at 491-92.
134. Id. at 494.
135. See id. (referring to "the required 'motive' finding" (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d
485, 492 (N.J. 1999)); id. at 495 (referring to "the finding of biased purpose"); id. (referring to "the
required biased purpose finding"); id. at 474 (noting the significance of the purpose "finding .. . be-
cause it increased-indeed, it doubled-the maximum" sentence at issue).
136. Id. at 496 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990)).
137. Id. at 496-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2 (1998)).
138. Justice Thomas candidly recognized that "Walton did approve a scheme by which a judge,
rather than a jury, determines an aggravating fact that makes a convict eligible for the death penalty,
and thus eligible for a greater punishment"-in clear conflict with the rule of Apprendi. See id. at 522
(Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas was in no hurry, however, to actually reach this issue in Apprendi
and seemed relieved to conclude that it was "a question for another day." See id. at 523.
139. See id. at 523-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor quipped that the majority opinion
"marshals virtually no authority to support its extraordinary rule. Indeed, it is remarkable that the Court
cannot identify a single instance, in the over 200 years since the ratification of the Bill of Rights, that
our Court has applied, as a constitutional requirement, the rule it announces today." Id. at 525. Justice
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damage as a result of the Apprendi decision, including the demise of the
federal Sentencing Guidelines and similar state sentencing schemes, as
well as great disruption and confusion within American criminal courts
generally.141 Nevertheless, for present purposes, it is enough to note that
the dissenters did not buy the majority's claim that Apprendi would not
impact the Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence. In particular, Justice
O'Connor argued that Walton "plainly reject[ed]" the 'increase in the
maximum penalty' rule" adopted in Apprendi.142 And regarding the Ap-
prendi majority's claim that Walton could be distinguished because it was
based on a system where "the jury makes all of the findings necessary to
expose the defendant to a death sentence," O'Connor described this prof-
fered "distinction" as both "baffling" and "demonstrably untrue."l43 The
dissenters in Apprendi had no doubt that this "watershed change in consti-
tutional law" portended a monumental reconsideration of the Court's de-
cisions in the capital sentencing context in terms of the jury's role.144 And
they were right.
B. Ring v. Arizona: The Capital Jury Revolution Begins
Two years later, in Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court took up the
issue of Apprendi's impact in the death penalty sentencing context. 145 The
Arizona capital sentencing scheme at issue in Ring was essentially the
same one that the Court had considered and upheld in 1990 in Walton.146
Under this system, after a jury convicted a defendant of first-degree mur-
der, the sentencing phase was conducted entirely by the trial judge, with-
out any jury involvement at all.1 47 And to sentence a defendant to death,
Breyer also dissented, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id at 555 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). Breyer focused on the argument that Apprendi is impractical. See id. at 555 (asserting that the
Apprendi rule "would seem to promote a procedural ideal," but that "the real world of criminal justice
cannot hope to meet any such ideal" and "can function only with the help of procedural compromises,
particularly in respect to sentencing").
140. See, e.g., id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (warning of potentially "severe" conse-
quences from Apprendi, including "invalidation of the [federal] Sentencing Guidelines," along with
the "determinate-sentencing schemes [of] many States"); id at 550 (describing Apprendi as "invali-
dat[ing] with the stroke of a pen three decades' worth of nationwide [sentencing] reform").
141. See id (forecasting that "perhaps the most significant impact of the Court's decision ... [is]
its unsettling effect on sentencing conducted under current federal and state determinate-sentencing
schemes"); id. at 551-52 (arguing that Apprendi "threatens to cast sentencing in the United States into
what will likely prove to be a lengthy period of considerable confusion" and that its impact "could be
colossal").
142. Id. at 536-37.
143. Id. at 538; see also id (noting that in Walton the Court "upheld the Arizona scheme specif-
ically on the ground that the Constitution does not require the jury to make the factual findings that
serve as the "prerequisite to imposition of [a death] sentence") (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 647 (1990)).
144. Id. at 524; see also id. at 539 (criticizing the Apprendi majority's "unprincipled and inex-
plicable distinctions between its decision and previous cases addressing the same subject in the capital
sentencing context"); id. at 538 ("If the Court does not intend to overrule Walton, one would be hard
pressed to tell from the opinion it issues today.").
145. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002).
146. Compare Walton, 497 U.S. at 642-44, with Ring, 536 U.S. at 588 (noting that Court upheld
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme in Walton).
147. Compare Walton, 497 U.S. at 643, with Ring, 536 U.S. at 592.
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the trial judge was required to make two findings: (1) that at least one stat-
utory aggravating circumstance exists in the case, and (2) that any mitigat-
ing circumstances in the case are not "sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency." 48
The Walton Court had concluded that "the Sixth Amendment does
not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sen-
tence of death be made by the jury." 4 9 Yet Apprendi held that "[i]t is un-
constitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of
facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed."5 o Although the Apprendi majority had asserted
that Arizona's system was compatible with this new Apprendi rule,'5 ' the
Arizona Supreme Court had since rejected that claim in Timothy Ring's
case.152 In particular, that court clarified that the maximum sentence an
Arizona defendant could receive for a first-degree murder conviction by a
jury was imprisonment for life (with or without parole), and thus that the
findings made as part of Arizona's capital sentencing process (entirely by
the trial judge) were necessary to increase a convicted murderer's maxi-
mum potential sentence to death.153 In fact, the Arizona Supreme Court
specifically rejected the Apprendi majority's characterization of Arizona's
capital sentencing system and endorsed the description of Justice O'Con-
nor (in her Apprendi dissent): "Therefore, the present case is precisely as
described in Justice O'Connor's dissent-Defendant's death sentence re-
quired the judge's factual findings." 54
The Ring Court acknowledged this clarification of Arizona law by
Arizona's highest court and the (now undeniable) "manifest tension be-
tween Walton and the reasoning of Apprendi."'5 ' The Ring Court empha-
sized that Apprendi "held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a
148. Walton, 479 U.S. at 644 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (1989) (current ver-
sion at §§ 13-751 to -752 (2017))). Compare id. at 643-44, with Ring, 536 U.S. at 593 ("The State's
law authorizes the judge to sentence the defendant to death only if there is at least one aggravating
circumstance and'there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."'
(emphasis added) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (2001) (current version at §§ 13-751
to -752 (2017))).
149. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per
curiam)).
150. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 252 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
151. See id. at 496-97.
152. See State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc), rev'd, 536 U.S. 584.
153. See id ("In Arizona, a defendant cannot be put to death solely on the basis of a jury's ver-
dict, regardless of the jury's factual findings. . . . It is only after a subsequent adversarial sentencing
hearing, at which the judge alone acts as the finder of the necessary statutory factual elements, that a
defendant may be sentenced to death.").
154. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1151. The Arizona Supreme Court was in the strange position of having a
Supreme Court case upholding its system (Walton) being challenged on the basis of a new Supreme
Court case, which included a clear misstatement of Arizona law (Apprendi). See id. at 151-52. After
recognizing the conflict between Walton and Apprendi, the Arizona Supreme Court found that Walton
was "still the controlling authority" and declined to strike down Arizona's capital sentencing system.
Id. at 1152.
155. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 596 (2002).
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defendant to be 'expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he
would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury ver-
dict alone." 5 6 And the Ring Court ultimately ruled-in a 7-2 decision,
with six Justices on the majority opinion157-that "Apprendi's reasoning
is irreconcilable with Walton's holding" and "overrule[d] Walton in rele-
vant part."15 8
The Ring Court declared that under the Sixth Amendment, "[c]apital
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, .. . are entitled to a jury
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase
in their maximum punishment."159 Furthermore, while reviewing its deci-
sion in Apprendi, the Ring Court recognized that "[i]f a State makes an
increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding
of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt."'60 And the Ring Court concluded by pro-
nouncing as follows:
The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would
be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary
to increase a defendant's sentence by two years [as in Apprendi], but
not the factfinding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the
Sixth Amendment applies to both.
161
On the other hand, the Ring Court noted that the specific claim at
issue in that case was "tightly delineated."162 The petitioner's claim was
that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial mandates that the first required
death penalty finding, the existence of at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance, must be made by a jury-not a court-in order for a death
sentence to be constitutional.163 The Ring Court emphasized that the peti-
tioner "makes no Sixth Amendment claim with respect to mitigating cir-
cumstances[;] . . . [n]or does he argue that the Sixth Amendment required
156. Id. at 588-89 (alterations in original) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483).
157. Id. at 587. Like many capital cases, Ring produced quite a bit of separate writing by the
Justices. See id. Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Ring Court, which was joined by Justices
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Id. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, which
was joined by Justice Thomas. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also filed a concur-
ring opinion. Id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 613 (Breyer, J., concurring). And Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, which
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
158. Id at 589 (majority opinion).
159. Id
160. Id at 602 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83); see also id. at 600 ("[U]nder the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amend-
ment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Jones
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999))).
161. Id. at 609.
162. Id. at 597 n.4.
163. Id. ("Ring's claim is tightly delineated: He contends only that the Sixth Amendment re-
quired jury findings on the aggravating circumstances asserted against him."). It should be noted that
the Ring Court did here use the term "findings" in this context, just as the Court had done regularly in
Apprendi.
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the jury to make the ultimate determination whether to impose the death
penalty."l64 Thus whether the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial also re-
quires that a jury, rather than a judge, make the second finding necessary
to sentence a defendant to death, i.e., whether the mitigating circumstances
in a case are "sufficiently substantial to call for leniency" or (as this anal-
ysis is more typically described by state law) whether any aggravating cir-
cumstances in a case "outweigh" any mitigating circumstances, was not
before the Ring Court. And the Ring Court declined to address or even
comment on this issue.
Hence the full impact of the Ring decision regarding the jury's con-
stitutionally-required role in capital sentencing under the Sixth Amend-
ment was left unsettled-much like the impact of Apprendi in the capital
sentencing realm had been left unsettled.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Ring, in typical pithy form, described
the functional, elements-based Apprendi/Ring rule thus:
[T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is that all facts essential to the imposition of the level of
punishment that the defendant receives-whether the statute calls
them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must
be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
165
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion (which was joined by Justice Thomas)
is also noteworthy for its commentary about why he (and perhaps other
Justices) hesitated to follow the Sixth Amendment rationale of Jones and
Apprendi to its logical conclusion in the capital sentencing context. His
opinion may also help explain why the majority opinions in both Jones
and Apprendi seemed to strain to declare that these cases would not impact
the Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence (which for over twenty years
had given the states complete discretion about how to use the jury in the
capital sentencing context, if at all).
Scalia described the Ring case as confronting him "with a difficult
choice" 66 because it was the Court's own cases, beginning with Furman,
that "compelled Arizona (and many other states) to specify particular 'ag-
gravating factors' that must be found before the death penalty can be im-
posed."1 6 7 And, Justice Scalia continued, "In my view, that line of deci-
sions had no proper foundation in the Constitution."68 He added, "I am
therefore reluctant to magnify the burdens that our Furman jurisprudence
imposes on the States." 69
164. Id. (citation omitted).







This acknowledgment of "reluctance" to apply constitutional doc-
trines adopted in the noncapital context to the capital sentencing context
is helpful in explaining some of the Court's unconvincing analysis "dis-
tinguishing" the capital cases (such as Walton) in Jones and Apprendi-
analysis that the Court ultimately had to discard in Ring. It should also be
noted that Justice Scalia was actually much more critical of the Wood-
son-Lockett line of cases, upon which the second required finding in most
capital jurisdictions is based (the weighing finding) than he was of Furman
and its progeny, which form the basis for the first requirement (the finding
of at least one aggravating circumstance).1 7 0
In his concurring opinion in Walton,17 1 which upheld the Arizona
capital scheme that was struck down in Ring,172 Justice Scalia sserted that
although he was dubious of the Court's decision in Furman, because Fur-
man was "arguably supported by" the language of the Eighth Amendment,
he was "willing to adhere to the precedent established by [the Court's]
Furman line of cases."l7 3 Regarding the Woodson-Lockett line of cases,
however, Scalia declared that "Woodson and Lockett are rationally irrec-
oncilable with Furman."1 74 He insisted that these two fundamental features
of modem capital sentencing "cannot be reconciled."17 5 He further main-
tained that he personally "would not know how to apply them-or, more
precisely, how to apply both [Woodson-Lockett] and Furman-if [he]
170. See Chris Hutton, Legitimizing Capital Punishment: Rationality Collides with Moral Judg-
ment, 42 S.D. L. REV. 399, 411 (1998) ("In contrast to his tolerating Furman, Justice Scalia ridiculed
the Woodson-Lockett cases."). In Woodson, the Supreme Court established that sentencing in death
penalty cases "requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of in-
flicting the penalty of death." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion). The Woodson Court likewise held that such decisions could not be "mandatory" based simply
upon a conviction of first-degree murder. Id. at 302, 305. In Lockett v. Ohio, the Court further held
that in death penalty cases the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments "require that the sentencer . .. not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death." 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). Hence Woodson and Lockett are fundamen-
tally about the constitutional requirement that the capital sentencer must be allowed to consider any
mitigating evidence that he defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. See id at 606;
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. And this imperative is typically accomplished by directing the jury to
consider the mitigating circumstances in the case and then determine whether the aggravating circum-
stances in the case "outweigh" the mitigating circumstances, which in most death penalty states is the
second requirement for a defendant o be eligible for a death sentence, i.e., the "weighing" require-
ment. See discussion infra Section III.C.
171. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), overruled by Ring,
536 U.S. 584.
172. Id. at 649 (majority opinion).
173. Id. at 670-71 (Scalia, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 673; see also id. at 667 ("It is difficult enough to justify the Furman requirement [of
limiting capital sentencing discretion] so long as the States are permitted to allow random mitigation;
but to impose it [Furman] while simultaneously requiring random mitigation is absurd.").
175. Id. at 664. Scalia added that describing these two lines of cases as forming the "twin objec-
tives" of modem death penalty law, id (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984)), "is
rather like referring to the twin objectives of good and evil." Id.
696 [Vol. 95:3
"FINDING" A WAY TO COMPLETE THE RING
wanted to."176 And he added: "Stare decisis cannot command the impos-
sible." 77 Justice Scalia then announced that from then on, he simply would
not uphold or enforce the Woodson-Lockett requirement that he capital
sentencer must be allowed to consider any mitigating evidence offered by
the defendant.'78
Considering that Justice Scalia was crucial to the slender 5-4 major-
ity decisions in both Jones and Apprendi,179 Scalia's mere grudging ac-
ceptance of Furman-and his outright hostility regarding Woodson-Lock-
ett-may well help explain the Court's unwillingness to take the funda-
mental Sixth Amendment principle of Jones/Apprendi/Ring to its full legal
and logical conclusion in the capital sentencing context, both within those
cases and subsequently.80 While the majority Justices in Jones, Apprendi,
and Ring agreed that the Sixth Amendment requires a beyond a reasonable
doubt jury finding on all the "elements" of a crime that establish the max-
imum sentence for that crime, these same Justices were quite deeply di-
vided regarding the Supreme Court's role in "regulating" the death pen-
alty, through the Eighth Amendment and otherwise.
Nevertheless, the capital sentencing decision in Ring, like its Jones
and Apprendi predecessors in the noncapital sentencing context, does
seem quite revolutionary. It announced a bold new rule, namely, that states
cannot leave capital sentencing entirely to trial judges because the Sixth
Amendment provides capital defendants with a right to have a jury (not
just a judge) determine whether at least one "aggravating circumstance"
exists, which is required for a constitutional death sentence. Ring also
squarely endorsed the functional approach of Apprendi, under which any
finding that increases the maximum sentence for an offense functions as
an "element" of a greater offense, which must be found by a jury and be-
yond a reasonable doubt. And Ring warned that states could not evade the
substance of the Court's new approach by simply renaming or recharac-
terizing the finding at issue and rejected Arizona's attempt to cling to the
result in Walton (by invoking certain Arizona statutory language) as fol-
lows: "If Arizona prevailed on [this] . . . argument, Apprendi would be
reduced to a 'meaningless and formalistic' rule of statutory drafting."'8 '
176. Id. at 673.
177. Id.
178. See id. ("I cannot adhere to a principle so lacking in support in constitutional text and so
plainly unworthy of respect under stare decisis. Accordingly, I will not, in this case or in the future,
vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment claim that the sentencer's discretion has been unlawfully re-
stricted.").
179. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 229 (1999).
180. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 558 (2002); see also id at 610-14 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). Justice Thomas, who joined Scalia's concurring opinion in Ring, was likewise critical to the
bare majority decisions in Jones and Apprendi. See id. at 610, 611-12.




Thus, on the one hand, the Ring Court appeared to be announcing a
rather bold, functional, and nonformalistic approach to future questions
about the right to a jury-determined process in the capital sentencing con-
text. And parts of the Ring opinion wax in quite poetic terms regarding the
significance and centrality of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury,
including in death cases:
The Sixth Amendment jury trial right . .. does not turn on the relative
rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders. Entrusting
to a judge the finding of facts necessary to support a death sentence
might be "an admirably fair and efficient scheme of criminal justice
designed for a society that is prepared to leave criminal justice to the
State.... The founders of the American Republic were not prepared
to leave it to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one
of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never
been efficient; but it has always been free."1 82
The Ring opinion also made a sharp break with many past cases by invok-
ing the language and reasoning of the dissenters in prior cases, which cer-
tainly sounds revolutionary.'8 3 And Justice Scalia asserted that despite his
previous "reluctan[ce]" to fully apply the Court's jury cases in the capital
sentencing context, he had "acquired new wisdom" (or "discarded old ig-
norance") and now recognized that "[w]e cannot preserve our veneration
for the protection of the jury in criminal cases if we render ourselves cal-
lous to the need for that protection by regularly imposing the death penalty
without it."l 84
On the other hand, the Ring Court seemed to want to keep the impact
of this revolution rather small and to require as few changes to state capital
sentencing as possible.'8 5 Two aspects of the Ring opinion are particularly
noteworthy in this regard. First, the Court explicitly limited its holding to
the first finding of most capital sentencing systems-the finding about
whether an aggravating circumstance exists in the case.1 86 Second, and
perhaps most significantly, the Ring Court repeatedly used the terms
"fact," "finding of facts," or "factfinding," rather than the broader term
182. Id. at 607 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
183. See, e.g., id. at 599 (quoting extensively from Justice Stevens's dissent in Walton, including
his description of the common law understanding of the jury's role at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted); id at 601 (quoting Justice Kennedy's dissent in Jones regarding the majority's attempt to
distinguish Walton); id. at 603 (quoting Justice O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi regarding the major-
ity's attempt to distinguish Walton).
184. Id. at 610-12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
185. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
186. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (majority opinion) ("[W]e overrule Walton to the extent that it
allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for
imposition of the death penalty.").
698 [Vol. 95:3
2018] "FINDING" A WAY TO COMPLETE THE RING 699
"finding" (or a term like "determination") to describe the type of determi-
nation at issue and the rules governing this determination.'87
Although the Apprendi Court had sometimes used the term "fact" to
describe the kind of determination at issue under its new rule, as explained
herein, the Apprendi Court often used the broader and more generic term
"finding" in this context.'88 And Apprendi's overall analysis revealed that
even its use of the term "fact" was essentially synonymous with the more
general term "finding."' 89 In addition, the Apprendi Court consistently de-
scribed the determination at issue in that case (whether the defendant had
acted with a "purpose to intimidate") as a "finding" that had to be made
by a jury, not just a trial judge.190 Thus, the Ring Court's use of the terms
"fact," "finding of facts," and "factfinding," within its descriptions of the
type of capital-stage determinations covered by its new rule, suggests that
the Ring Court may have had a narrower vision of its new rule than the
Apprendi Court did or perhaps that the Ring Court was more "reluctant"
to impose the full logical and legal force of this new rule in the capital
context than it was in the noncapital context of Jones and Apprendi. It is
likewise entirely possible that the Ring opinion was written with more nar-
row language to "bring together" as many Justices as possible, including
Justices Scalia and Thomas, who had a much different view of the Court's
appropriate role when it came to death penalty cases.191
Regardless of the possible motivation, if any, for the Ring Court's
frequent use of the seemingly more narrow terms "fact," "finding of fact,"
187. See, e.g., id at 589 ("Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, we conclude,
are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment."); id. at 607 (discussing the inconsistency of "[e]ntrusting to a judge the find-
ing of facts necessary to support a death sentence" with the founder's vision of the right to jury trial);
id. at 609 ("The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly dimin-
ished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but
not the factfinding necessary to put him to death.").
188. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying note 128.
190. See supra text accompanying note 124.
191. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
described the Ring decision as follows:
[TIoday's judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing. What today's decision says is
that the jury must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor existed. Those
States that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue to do so-
by requiring a priorjury finding of [an] aggravating factor in the sentencing phase, or, more
simply, by placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically belongs any-
way) in the guilt phase.
Id. Justice Scalia here emphasizes his view that the Constitution does not require that a jury make the
ultimate capital sentencing decision and his desire that the Court go no further than it was going in
Ring. Scalia's view stands in sharp contrast with the view expressed by Justice Breyer in his separate
opinion in Ring, asserting that the Eighth Amendment does require that the jury make the ultimate
capital sentencing decision. See id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The Eighth Amendment requires
that a jury, not a judge, make the decision to sentence a defendant to death."). Justice Scalia's response
to this view was rather caustic: "While I am, as always, pleased to travel in Justice Breyer's company,
the unfortunate fact is that today's judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing.. . . Justice Breyer
is on the wrong flight; he should either get off before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Ap-
prendi-land."). Id. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and "factfinding" to describe the kind of determination at issue-rather
than the more broad and open-ended term "finding," which Apprendi used
regularly in this context-this approach left the door open to arguments
by death penalty states and the federal government that the weighing find-
ing is not a "factual" finding and, thus, is not covered by the Ring decision
and rule. As will be described in the next section, such arguments were
quite successful in the years following Ring, despite the Ring Court's em-
phasis that it was adopting afunctional approach, rather than a formalistic
one, and that it was applying the elements-based approach of Apprendi to
the capital sentencing context.
The application of Ring should have involved looking to the substan-
tive law of the jurisdiction at issue to decide whether a particular determi-
nation is necessary to increase the defendant's maximum possible sen-
tence from some form of imprisonment to death (i.e., whether a particular
finding is a required "element" for a death sentence) as the basis for deter-
mining whether the Sixth Amendment requires that he determination at
issue be made by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately,
this was not the approach that was typically taken in the years between
Ring and the Supreme Court's next big decision in this realm, Hurst v.
Florida, which was not until 2016.192
C. The Revolution Stalls on Hybrid Juries and Falters on Weighing
1. From All-Judge Sentencing to Judge-Jury Sentencing
The Ring Court recognized that at the time of its 2002 decision, five
states had "all-judge" capital sentencing systems.193 The Court noted that
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska all "commit both capi-
tal sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to
judges."'9 4 Justice O'Connor remarked in her dissent that the Ring major-
ity had effectively declared the capital sentencing schemes of these five
states to be unconstitutional.195 After Ring, Arizona, Colorado, and Idaho
switched to entirely jury-determined capital sentencing schemes, placing
both the key capital findings and the ultimate death penalty decision en-
tirely in the hands of the jury.1 96 Montana and Nebraska, on the other hand,
responded to Ring by altering their schemes to place the aggravating cir-
cumstances decision in the hands of the jury, but continued to place the
192. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
193. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6.
194. Id. (listing relevant statutes for Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska).
195. Id. at 620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
196. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703 to -703.01 (2003) (current version at §§ 13-751
to -752 (2017)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (2003) (amended 2014); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515
(2003) (amended 2006).
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"weighing" finding and the ultimate sentencing decision in the hands of
judgeS. 197
The Ring Court also recognized that as of 2002, there were four states
with "hybrid" capital sentencing systems, in which the jury rendered an
"advisory verdict" about how the jury thought the defendant should be
sentenced, but the judge then independently made the required capital
findings and the final sentencing decision-which could include a death
sentence, even when the jury had recommended imprisonment.' Ring
recognized Alabama, Florida, Delaware, and Indiana as all having such a
system.1 99 Justice O'Connor worried in her dissent that death row prison-
ers in these states would "seize on" the Ring decision to challenge their
200
sentences. She was not wrong, but such prisoners had very little success
in this regard (prior to 2016).201
In particular, the Supreme Courts of both Florida and Alabama-two
of the most "active" death penalty states in America-upheld the consti-
tutionality of their "advisory jury" capital sentencing systems against
202
Ring-based Sixth Amendment challenges. In response to a Ring chal-
lenge in a Florida case, the Florida Supreme Court, in a per curiam opin-
ion, noted: (1) that the U.S. Supreme Court had repeatedly upheld Flor-
ida's capital sentencing system in the past (citing Proffitt, Spaziano, and
Hildwin), (2) that Ring did not directly address the constitutionality of
Florida's system, and (3) that the Supreme Court had lifted a stay in the
case at issue without explicitly directing reconsideration in light of Ring-
and then rejected the defendant's Ring claim without substantive analy-
- 203
When faced with a Ring challenge in the Alabama case of Ex parte
Waldrop,204 the Alabama Supreme Court emphasized the differences be-
tween the Arizona system at issue in Ring and the Alabama capital system,
197. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520 to -2522 (2003)
(amended 2011). In Montana, after a jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance, the trial judge
must decide whether there are "mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency,"
which determines whether the defendant is sentenced to death. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305.
As in Arizona, Montana effectively defines any sentence less than death in this context as "leniency."
See id.; accord ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(E) (2017) (disallowing the death penalty unless the
jury "determines that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leni-
ency"). In Nebraska, after a jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance, a three-judge panel is
used to receive and evaluate mitigating evidence, which includes determining "[w]hether the aggra-
vating circumstances . . . justify imposition of the sentence of death" and "[w]hether sufficient miti-
gating circumstances exist which approach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circum-
stances," and then make the ultimate death penalty sentencing decision, which must be unanimous if
a death sentence is imposed. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (2017).
198. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6.
199. Id. (listing relevant statutes from Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana).
200. Id. at 621 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
201. See infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
203. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam), abrogated by Hurst
v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
204. 859 So. 2d 1181 (Ala. 2002).
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particularly the fact that many of Alabama's second-stage "aggravating
circumstances" duplicate or "overlap" with Alabama's "capital offenses,"
(i.e., the aggravated murder offenses that must be found by a jury during
the guilt stage, in order for a defendant to be subject to a possible death
205sentence). In the case at issue, the defendant had been convicted of the
capital offense of murder during a robbery, which overlapped with one of
the aggravating circumstances alleged in the case (murder during a rob-
bery).20 6 Consequently, the Alabama Supreme Court asserted that (in ef-
fect) "the jury, and not the trial judge, determined the existence of the 'ag-
gravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty,"'
207
based on the jury's decision to convict the defendant, even though the jury
had actually recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without parole
during the sentencing hearing.208 The Waldrop court concluded that Ala-
bama's first-stage narrowing "is all Ring and Apprendi require,"209 even
though the "overlap" between Alabama's first-stage capital offenses and
second-stage aggravating circumstances is not complete or perfect in gen-
eral (i.e., the two lists are not identical) and was not complete or perfect
even in that case (because the judge-imposed death sentence in the Wal-
drop case also relied on a second aggravating circumstance, i.e., that the
murder was "heinous, atrocious, or cruel," for which there was no corre-
sponding Alabama "capital offense" and no jury finding at trial).2 10
Hence the Florida and Alabama Supreme Courts maintained the con-
stitutionality of their hybrid judge-jury capital sentencing systems in the
aftermath of Ring, and the legislatures of both states declined to make any
changes to their capital systems.in light of the Ring decision. Indiana, on
the other hand, quickly shifted to a jury-dominated capital sentencing sys-
tem, placing both the required capital findings and the ultimate sentencing
decision in the hands of the jury. 2 11 And Delaware modified its hybrid sys-
tem by insisting that any death sentence be based upon a ."beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" jury finding of at least one aggravating circumstance, but
continued to allow the trial court to make its own finding about whether
205. Id. at 1188 (quoting Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 178 (Ala. 1997)).
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602, 609 (2002)). The Waldrop court added,
"Therefore, the findings reflected in the jury's [guilt-stage] verdict alone exposed [the defendant] to a
range of punishment that had as its maximum the death penalty." Id.
208. Id at 1184.
209. Id at 1188.
210. See id. at 1185 (quoting Waldrop v. State, 859 So. 2d 1138, 1174 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000));
see also id at 1188 (noting the overlap between the capital offense and an aggravating factor). Com-
pare ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (2017) (listing "capital offenses"), with § 13A-5-49 (listing "aggravating
circumstances"). The Alabama Supreme Court has continued to rely on the (imperfect) overlap be-
tween Alabama's first-stage capital offenses and second-stage aggravating circumstances to uphold
the constitutionality of its advisory jury system, even after the Supreme Court struck down Florida's
advisory jury system in Hurst. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016); Ex parte Bohannon,
222 So. 3d 525, 528-36 (Ala. 2016) (quoting extensively from Waldrop).
211. See IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(l)(1), (2) (2003) (amended 2016) (stating that the jury must find
the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance and that any aggravating circumstances "out-
weigh" the mitigating circumstances).
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any aggravating circumstances "outweighed" any mitigating circum-
stances, which would determine whether the defendant was actually sen-
tenced to death.2 12 Although the Delaware jury was required to make an
actual finding on both "the existence of at least [one] aggravating circum-
stance" and whether "the aggravating circumstances .. .outweigh the mit-
igating circumstances,"2 13 the jury's weighing "recommendation" only
had to be given "such consideration as deemed appropriate" by the
judge.2 14
Hence soon after the Ring decision, there were no more all-judge cap-
ital sentencing systems among the states, but there were five states-Flor-
ida, Alabama, Delaware, Montana, and Nebraska-that maintained some
type of hybrid approach, all of which placed both the weighing determina-
tion and the ultimate sentencing decision in the hands of trial judges. In
addition, both Florida and Alabama continued to base the death sentences
in their states on the findings of the trial judge regarding the aggravating
circumstances in the case, which were not limited to the aggravating cir-
cumstances found by the jury, either implicitly (during the guilt stage in
Alabama) or explicitly (during the sentencing stage in either state).2 15 Fur-
thermore, the statutory schemes in both Florida and Alabama continued to
allow trial judges to override jury recommendations of life with sentences
of death, just as they were doing at the time Ring was decided in 2002.216
Nevertheless, despite numerous opportunities (particularly in cases from
Florida and Alabama) to evaluate the constitutionality of these judge-dom-
inated, hybrid capital systems, the Supreme Court declined to take up any
new Ring-based capital sentencing challenges for over thirteen years.
2. The Misnomer of Eighth Amendment "Death Eligibility"
For the overwhelming majority of death penalty jurisdictions that al-
ready relied entirely upon the jury for all capital sentencing determina-
tions, the fact that Ring applied to the first required capital finding, i.e., that
any aggravating circumstances must be found by a jury and be found be-
yond a reasonable doubt, was quite clear and was easily implemented (if
any change to existing law was even needed). The bigger question was
whether the Ring decision meant that the second finding that is required in
most capital jurisdictions, i.e., that any aggravating circumstances in a case
"outweigh" any mitigating circumstances (or some similar finding), must
likewise be found by a jury and be found beyond a reasonable doubt.2 17
212. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 4209(d)(1) (2003) (amended 2013).
213. Id. § 4209(c)(3)(a)(1), (2).
214. Id. § 4209(d)(1).
215. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46(e), -47(d)-(e) (2003); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1)-(3) (2003)
(amended 2017).
216. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3).
217. Although different death penalty jurisdictions formulate this "weighing" or "balancing" de-
cision in different ways, the great majority of American death penalty jurisdictions require that the
capital decisionmaker make some kind of weighing or balancing finding in order to sentence a defend-
ant to death. See infra text accompanying note 243.
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As it turns out, resolution of the Sixth Amendment questions of
whether the capital weighing finding must be made by a jury and "beyond
a reasonable doubt" has been critically impacted by the Supreme Court's
use of a few specific words and concepts: (1) the Court's use of the word
"fact" in Ring, and (2) the Court's use of the word "eligible," in terms of
being "eligible for the death penalty," in its Eighth Amendment cases. This
Article has already addressed the theme that the Ring Court's use of the
term "fact" was different than the Apprendi Court's use of this term, which
the Apprendi Court used more broadly and interchangeably with the more
general term "finding"-a generic term that Apprendi used to describe any
determination that must be made in order for a defendant to be sentenced
to death.
Before turning to an analysis of how various death penalty states and
the federal circuit courts have resolved the applicability of Apprendi/Ring
to the capital weighing finding, this Article will briefly (and quite sum-
marily) suggest that the Supreme Court's use of the concept of being "eli-
gible" for the death penalty in the Eighth Amendment context is incom-
plete and potentially misleading, at least if it is taken too literally or ap-
plied in the Sixth Amendment context. In the Sixth Amendment context,
an unreflective use of the concept of being "death eligible" (based merely
upon the finding of an aggravating circumstance) is particularly likely to
lead to incongruous and constitutionally inappropriate results.
In Tuilaepa v. California,218 the Supreme Court summarized its
Eighth Amendment cases as addressing "two different aspects of the cap-
ital decisionmaking process: the eligibility decision and the selection de-
cision."2 19 The Court recognized that a defendant can only be eligible for
the death penalty upon conviction "of a crime for which the death penalty
is a [constitutionally] proportionate punishment," such as murder.220 The
Court then made this (seemingly innocuous) statement: "To render a de-
fendant eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case, . . . the trier of
fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one 'aggravating cir-
cumstance' (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase."22' Im-
portantly, the Court hereby limited the idea of being "eligible" for a death
sentence to simply a murder conviction, followed by a finding of at least
one aggravating circumstance (or a functional equivalent). The Court then
218. 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
219. Id. at 971.
220. Id. at 971-72.
221. Id. (emphasis added). The Court noted that this "aggravating circumstance": (1) could be
"contained in the definition of the crime or in a separate sentencing factor (or in both)"; (2) "must
apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder"; and (3) "may not be unconstitutionally
vague." Id at 972.
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described the remainder of the capital sentencing process as the "selec-
tion" phase, "where the sentencer determines whether a defendant eligible
for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence."222
The capital sentencing process described in Tuilaepa (and other
Eighth Amendment cases) has two basic components: (1) a finding that at
least one aggravating circumstance xists in the case, which (if made)
makes the capital defendant eligible for a death sentence, and (2) a process
during which the decisionmaker considers all the evidence presented and
then selects a sentence for the defendant.223 The decisionmaker can only
proceed to the selection phase if the required finding of an aggravator is
made, but the Tuilaepa Court made clear that the Eighth Amendment does
not require that any specific additional findings be made during the selec-
224tion process.
The problem with this approach to death "eligibility," however, is
that it is not based upon an analysis of what is actually required by the
jurisdiction at issue for a death sentence to be lawfully imposed. In fact,
the California statute at issue in Tuilaepa (then and now) mandates that in
order for a defendant to be sentenced to death, the jury must "conclude[]
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances."225 Thus, a California defendant is not actually eligible for a death
sentence-at least not in the sense that this term is typically used-based
only on the finding of an aggravating circumstance (i.e., a first-stage "spe-
cial circumstance" under California law) because California law also re-
quires that the jury make a finding/conclusion/determination regarding the
weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly declined to mandate under the
Eighth Amendment that state death penalty systems require such addi-
226
tional findings (beyond the existence of an aggravating circumstance),
it is important to recognize that the Court's use of the concept of death
222. Id. (emphasis added). Regarding this selection phase, the Tuilaepa Court described the re-
quirements of the Eighth Amendment as follows: "What is important at the selection stage is an indi-
vidualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the
crime." Id (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)). The Court noted that this require-
ment "is met when the jury can consider relevant mitigating evidence of the character and record of
the defendant and the circumstances of the crime." Id.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 977-80. Hence the Tuilaepa Court rejected the petitioners' claim that the Eighth
Amendment requires that specific findings be made about the "selection factors" that a California jury
is directed to consider during the capital sentencing process, id., and concluded that "the sentencer
may be given 'unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after
it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty,"' id. at 979-80
(quoting Zant, 426 U.S. at 875).
225. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 2017) (death sentence allowed only "if the trier of
fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances"); id. ("If
the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances
the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of [imprisonment] . . . for a term of life without the possibility
of parole.").
226. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 979-80.
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eligibility (in this Eighth Amendment context) is not based upon a deter-
mination regarding what the law of a particular jurisdiction actually re-
quires for a death sentence.
In most death penalty jurisdictions, death penalty sentencing actually
involves three components: (1) afinding about whether an aggravating cir-
cumstance exists in the case, which narrows the class of murders to which
the death penalty can potentially be applied; (2) a process during which
the decisionmaker considers all the evidence presented, including all the
mitigating circumstances in the case; and (3) afinding about whether any
aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances in the
227case (or the functional equivalent of such a finding). In some states, a
death sentence follows automatically from this second finding.228 In other
states, there is actually a fourth step, in which the sentencer chooses
whether to sentence the defendant o death or to some form of imprison-
22ment (i.e., the sentencer selects the sentence).229 In both such systems, the
second finding is required for a death sentence; and a defendant is not truly
eligible to be sentenced to death until the second finding is made.
Although not all death penalty jurisdictions require a weighing-type
finding, most do.230 Consequently, whatever merit the concept of being
"death eligible" might have in the Eighth Amendment realm-based
merely upon a murder conviction and a finding of at least one aggrava-
tor-because this concept is not based upon a review of the substantive
law of the jurisdiction at issue, this term is potentially quite misleading in
the Sixth Amendment context. While the Eighth Amendment approach of
cases like Tuilaepa simply declares, in general, that in order to become
"eligible for the death penalty[,]. . . the trier of fact must convict the de-
fendant of murder and find one 'aggravating circumstance,"'Z31 the Sixth
Amendment approach of Ring/Apprendi mandates a review of the substan-
tive law of the jurisdiction at issue to determine the required elements for
a death sentence in that jurisdiction. This jurisdiction-specific review is
227. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1), (2) (2017). Such weighing-type findings can
include a determination that based upon all the evidence in the case, a death sentence is "justified" or
"appropriate." See id
228. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(3) (2017) ("If the jury determines that one or more
aggravating circumstances . . . exist and that they outweigh the mitigating circumstances, if any, it
shall return a verdict of death"); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(E) (2017) ("The trier of fact shall
impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in subsection F of this section and then determines that there are no mitigating circum-
stances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.").
229. See, e.g., OKLA. UNIF. JURY INSTR. CRIM. 4-80 (2d ed. 2017) ("If you unanimously find
that one or more of the aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, the death penalty
shall not be imposed unless you also unanimously find that any such aggravating circumstance or
circumstances outweigh the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances. Even ifyou find that the
aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh(s) the mitigating circumstance(s), you may impose a sentence
of imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole or imprisonment for life without the possibility
of parole.").
230. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
231. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-72.
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required by the Sixth Amendment because it is these jurisdiction-specific
required elements for a death sentence that must be found by a jury and
beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi and Ring. A defendant is not
truly "eligible" for a death sentence in any jurisdiction until the prosecu-
tion has established all the required elements for a death sentence in that
jurisdiction. And under the approach ofApprendi/Ring, it is precisely these
elements that must be found both by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Rejection of the Ring Rule for the Weighing Finding
By 2002, most death penalty states required that before a capital de-
fendant could be sentenced to death, the sentencing decisionmaker (usu-
ally a jury) had to find that the aggravating circumstances in the case out-
weighed the mitigating circumstances (or make some similar "weighing"
type finding).232 Yet few state statutes contained a particular standard of
proof or "certainty standard" by which this decision had to be made.233
Hence, after Ring, death penalty states that did not require all-jury sen-
tencing and states that did have jury sentencing but did not require that the
weighing finding be made beyond a reasonable doubt both began facing
claims that under Apprendi and Ring, the Sixth Amendment requires that
the weighing finding be made by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt.234
Unfortunately for the capital defendants and death row inmates who were
making these claims, however, such claims were rejected by the great ma-
jority of the state courts of last resort that decided them.2 35
Alabama appears to have been the first state supreme court to address
this issue in detail, taking it up in Ex parte Waldrop,236 the same year that
Ring was decided. As noted earlier, this decision addressed (and upheld)
237
post-Ring the constitutionality of Alabama's hybrid judge-jury system.
Waldrop also addressed whether the weighing determination had to made
by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt. The Waldrop court rejected this
claim and distinguished Ring, asserting that "the weighing process is not
a factual determination" and "is not susceptible to any quantum of
proof."238 Rather, the court found, "[I]t is a moral or legal judgment that
takes into account a theoretically limitless set of facts."2 39 The Waldrop
court also invoked the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment eligibility
cases to support its ruling that the weighing finding is not an element of a
death sentence.240 The court concluded: "Thus, the determination whether
232. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2003) ("Of the [thirty-eight] States with capital
punishment, [twenty-nine] generally commit sentencing decision to juries."); see also infra note 243
and accompanying text (listing state death penalty statutes requiring "weighing" type findings).
233. See infra note 339 and accompanying text.
234. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
235. See infra note 243 and accompanying text..
236. See Exparte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1188, 1188-90 (Ala. 2002).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 204-10.
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the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances is
not a finding of fact or an element of the offense. Consequently, Ring and
Apprendi do not require that a jury weigh the aggravating circumstances
and the mitigating circumstances."241 The court likewise concluded that
the weighing finding does not have to be made beyond a reasonable
doubt.242
The Alabama Supreme Court's approach set the tone for what would
be a steady stream of state court rejections of the claim that the Sixth
Amendment rule of Apprendi/Ring applies to the capital weighing finding.
Under the functional and elements-based rule of Apprendi/Ring, these
state courts should have been focused on determining whether the weigh-
ing finding (or whatever finding was at issue) was required for a death
sentence under the law of that jurisdiction, i.e., whether the weighing find-
ing was required in order to increase a convicted murderer's maximum
possible sentence from some form of imprisonment to death. Instead, state
courts of last resort that addressed the weighing issue overwhelmingly
concluded that Ring does not even apply to the weighing finding because
a weighing determination is not the kind of "fact" or "factual finding" that
is covered by Ring-often while also emphasizing that because a defend-
ant is considered "eligible" for a death sentence (under the Eighth Amend-
ment) after a proper finding of an aggravating circumstance, any weighing
determination that occurs after that is merely part of the process of select-
ing the defendant's punishment, rather than a required element for a death
sentence.24 3
241. Id. at I190.
242. Id ("While the existence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance is a fact susceptible
to proof . . , the relative weight is not. The process of weighing . . . , unlike facts, is not susceptible
to proof by either party.") (first emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Ford v. Strickland, 696
F.2d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 1983)).
243. See, e.g., People v. Prieto, 66 P.3d 1123, 1147 (Cal. 2003) (rejecting a Ring weighing claim
because "the penalty phase determination 'is inherently moral and normative, not factual' (quoting
People v. Rodriguez, 726 P.2d 113, 144 (Cal. 1986))); Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314, 322 (Del. 2003)
(finding that "[alithough a judge cannot sentence a defendant to death without finding that the aggra-
vating factors outweigh the mitigating factors," because a defendant becomes "eligible" for a death
sentence based on "the finding of [a] statutory aggravator[,].... Ring does not extend to the weighing
phase"), overruled by Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016); Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 266
(Ind. 2004) (because defendant is already "eligible" for death penalty before required weighing find-
ing, Apprendi and Ring do not require "that weighing be done under a reasonable doubt standard");
Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1151 (Md. 2003) ("[T]he weighing process is not a fact-finding one
based on evidence ... . The weighing process is purely ajudgmental one, of balancing the mitigator(s)
against the aggravator(s) to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment in the particular
case."); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 628 (Neb. 2003) (rejecting a claim that Ring applies to a
weighing finding by a three-judge panel and concluding that "[i]t is the determination of 'death eligi-
bility' [by the finding of an aggravating circumstance] . . . [that] triggers the Sixth Amendment right
to jury determination as delineated in Apprendi and Ring"); Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235, 241 (Nev.
2011) (concluding that "weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a factual
determination" under Apprendi and Ring); State v. Addison, 87 A.3d 1, 178 (N.H. 2013) (per curiam)
("[T]he weighing process is neither a 'fact' nor an element of the charged offense." (citing U.S. v.
Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir. 2007))); State v. Fry, 126 P.3d 516, 531, 534 (N.M. 2005) (after
noting that "[t]he jury can sentence a defendant to death only if it unanimously determines that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances," rejecting a Ring weighing claim
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A few state supreme courts rejected a claim that the Sixth Amend-
ment Ring rule applies to a capital weighing finding even after specifically
recognizing that the state death penalty statute at issue required that the
weighing finding be made in order for a defendant to be sentenced to
death. In other words, these state courts specifically recognized that the
weighing finding was necessary to "increase[] a defendant's maximum
possible sentence,"244 which is exactly the trigger for the functional rule of
Apprendi/Ring, but then still concluded that the Ring rule did not apply.24 5
For example, the Supreme Court of Indiana recognized that "before the
jury can recommend the death penalty, it must find that. . . 'any mitigating
circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance
or circumstances."'246 Nevertheless, in the same opinion the court went on
to conclude that this required weighing finding was not covered by Ring
because an Indiana defendant becomes "eligible" for the death penalty
based merely upon the finding of an aggravating circumstance.24 7 And the
Nevada Supreme Court, after emphasizing that the weighing finding does
not involve a finding of fact,248 actually stated: "[E]ven if the result of the
weighing determination increases the maximum sentence for first-degree
murder beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, it is not a factual find-
ing that is susceptible to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
proof."249 The court thereby turned the functional, elements-based test of
Ring upon its head.
There were a few state courts that applied the Apprendi/Ring test to
the weighing finding in the functional manner that these decisions estab-
lished, but not many. The Supreme Court of Missouri carefully and
because "[lt]he balancing process does not contemplate the finding of a 'fact' that increases a defend-
ant's maximum possible sentence within the meaning of Apprendi"); State v. Belton, 74 N.E.3d 319,
337 (Ohio 2016) ("Weighing is not a fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment, because
'[t]hese determinations cannot increase the potential punishment to which a defendant is exposed as a
consequence of the eligibility determination."' (quoting Gales, 658 N.W.2d at 628)); id ("[T]he
weighing process amounts to 'a complex moral judgment' about what penalty to impose upon a de-
fendant who is already death-penalty eligible." (quoting United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 516
(4th Cir. 2013))); Torres v. State, 58 P.3d 214, 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (summarily rejecting a
Ring weighing claim); Commonwealth v. Roney, 866 A.2d 351, 360-61 (Pa. 2005) (rejecting a weigh-
ing claim because it "does not implicate the 'fact-finding' concerns articulated in Apprendi and Ring").
244. Fry, 126 P.3d at 534.
245. See, e.g., Brice, 815 A.2d at 322; Fry, 126 P.3d at 531, 534; see also supra note 243.
246. Ritchie, 809 N.E.2d at 264-65 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(l)(2) (2003)).
247. Id. at 265-66. Similarly, although the California Supreme Court upheld a California stand-
ard death penalty jury instruction because it correctly and "clearly stated that the death penalty could
be imposed only if the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating," People
v. Duncan, 810 P.2d 131, 144 (Cal. 1991) (en banc), that court has also held that "Ring imposes no
new constitutional requirements on California's penalty phase proceedings," because a California de-
fendant is already "eligible" for a death sentence based upon the guilt-phase narrowing process in
California. Prieto, 66 P.3d at 1147; see also People v. Samuels, 113 P.3d 1125, 1152 (Cal. 2005)
(concluding that Ring does not require "that the jury be instructed concerning burden of proof' for
weighing determination).
248. See Nunnery, 263 P.3d at 251-53 (citing cases finding that capital weighing is not
"fact-finding" under Ring and quoting dictionary definition of "fact").
249. Id. at 250.
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thoughtfully applied the Ring rule to the specific requirements of Mis-
250souri's death penalty statute. In particular, the court concluded that be-
cause a death sentence requires a finding that any mitigating evidence is
not "sufficient to outweigh the evidence in aggravation,"25 1 this determi-
252nation is a "factual finding[]" under Ring that must be made by a jury.
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that because the (for-
mer) Colorado death penalty statue established that a death sentence re-
quired a finding (by a three-judge panel) that "[t]here are insufficient mit-
igating factors to outweigh the aggravator or factors that were proved,"
this weighing determination constitutes a "finding of fact" under Ring, and
thus that both the finding of an aggravator and the weighing finding have
253to be made by a jury. Hence the court concluded that the Colorado death
penalty statute under which the defendants had been sentenced-based
upon the findings of a three-judge panel-was unconstitutional under
Ring.254 Alas, this kind of careful, functional analysis was the exception,
not the norm, in the years after Ring.255
In the federal realm, federal circuit courts considering the Federal
Death Penalty Act (FDPA)2 56 have likewise overwhelmingly concluded
that Ring does not apply to capital weighing and thus that federal capital
juries need not apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard when mak-
257ing the weighing evaluation required by the FDPA. In the sentencing
phase of an FDPA case, "the jury must make three determinations ... be-
fore it can impose the death penalty."258 The first two determinations-
that the defendant acted with the required mens rea and that at least one
statutory aggravating factor exists in the case-must be found unani-
mously and beyond a reasonable doubt.259 The third determination, how-
ever, while it must be found unanimously by the jury, need not be found
"beyond a reasonable doubt" under the FDPA.260 Rather, the jury must
250. See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 256-62 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
251. Id. at 258 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.030.4(4) (1994)).
252. See id. at 261. This required finding (and others) had been made by the trial judge in that
case, after ajury voted 11-1 in favor of a life sentence. Id. at 261. The Missouri Supreme Court struck
down the defendant's death sentence. Id. at 256, 262 ("This process clearly violated the requirements
of Ring that the jury rather than the judge determine the facts on which the death penalty is based.").
253. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 266-67 (Colo. 2003) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-103(2)(b)(II)(A)-(B) (2000) (repealed 2002)).
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 460 (Nev. 2002) (per curiam) (concluding that
because a death sentence in Nevada requires a finding "'that there are no mitigating circumstances
sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found[,]' . . . Ring requires a
jury to make this finding" (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554(3) (1998))), overruled by Nunnery,
263 P.3d 235. But see Nunnery, 263 P.3d at 250-51 (overruling Johnson's analysis of the Ring weigh-
ing issue).
256. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-99 (2012).
257. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
258. United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 749 (8th Cir. 2005).
259. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-93).
260. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e).
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decide "whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist suffi-
ciently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify
a sentence of death."261
As in the state realm, federal defendants sentenced to death under the
FDPA have challenged the FDPA's failure to require that this weighing
finding be made "beyond a reasonable doubt" as a violation of the Sixth
Amendment under Apprendi/Ring. Thus far, the federal circuit courts have
rejected this, claim, mostly by ruling that the weighing finding is not a
"factual" determination under the terms of Apprendi/Ring.262 These courts
typically contrast the type of factual determination that the jury must make
(and make beyond a reasonable doubt) under Ring with the highly subjec-
tive and largely moral "judgment" that must be made about whether a de-
fendant should be sentenced to death.26 3
There are currently no federal circuits that hold that the jury's FDPA
weighing finding must be made beyond a reasonable doubt, although there
was one circuit court panel that did so find. In 2011, in United States v.
264 1 SiGabrion, a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a death
sentence based upon its conclusion that under Apprendi/Ring the FDPA
weighing determination is subject to the reasonable doubt standard.265 Alt-
hough the five circuits that had addressed the issue at the time had ruled
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. See, e.g., Purkey, 428 F.3d at 750 (asserting that "it makes no sense to speak of the weighing
process mandated by [the FDPA] as an elemental fact"); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 346
(5th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he Apprendi/Ring rule should not apply here because the jury's decision that the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors is not a finding offact.... The Apprendi/Ring rule
applies by its terms only to findings of fact, not to moral judgments."); United States v. Sampson, 486
F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim for assuming "that the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors is afact" and concluding that "the requisite weighing constitutes a process, not a
fact to be found"); United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1107-08 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting and
adopting analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Fields, 483 F.3d at 346); United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d
931, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2007) (questioning whether weighing involves finding of "fact," noting "no
authority" suggesting Apprendi extends this far and rejecting the claim under plain error review);
United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) (clarifying that analysis of Barrett, 496
F.3d 1079, which involved the death penalty under a different federal statute, "applies with equal force
in connection with the FDPA"); United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 516 (4th Cir. 2013) (joining
the "four other circuits [that] have held that the reasonable-doubt standard does not apply to the weigh-
ing of aggravating and mitigating factors, reasoning that that process constitutes not a factual determi-
nation, but a complex moral judgment"); United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 532 (6th Cir. 2013)
(en bane) ("The problem with [the defendant's] argument is that Apprendi does not apply to every
'determination' that increases a defendant's maximum sentence. Instead it applies only to findings of
'fact' that have that effect.").
263. See, e.g., Fields, 483 F.3d at 346 (contrasting "findings of fact" with the weighing determi-
nation, which "is a 'highly subjective,' 'largely moral judgment' 'regarding the punishment that a
particular person deserves"' (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985))); Barrett,
496 F.3d at 1107-08 (quoting Fields, 483 F.3d at 346); see also Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 993 (character-
izing weighing as an "individualized judgment whether a death sentence is justified"); Gabrion, 719
F.3d at 532-33 (characterizing FDPA's weighing requirement as "not a finding of fact, but a moral
judgment").
264. 648 F.3d 307 (6thCir. 2011), rev'den bane, 719 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2013).
265. Id. at 329 ("[O]ur determination that [the defendant] was entitled to a reasonable doubt
instruction as to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors requires the reversal of his death
sentence.").
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otherwise, the Sixth Circuit panel undertook a functional approach to the
question at issue-just as the Supreme Court had instructed in Apprendi
and Ring.266
The Gabrion panel, in an opinion by Judge Merritt, noted that "the
[FDPA] plainly requires as a necessary precondition to a capital defend-
ant's receiving the sentence of death that the government prove and the
jury find that [the] aggravators outweigh the mitigators."2 67 The panel de-
scribed the government's argument that, under the FDPA, the defendant
becomes eligible for a death sentence when the jury finds the presence of
at least one aggravator (i.e., prior to any weighing) as "an empty formalism
of the sort the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Ring."26 8 The panel's
functional analysis was as follows:
It is plain from the Act that, even after the jury finds the presence of
aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt, more needs to be proven be-
fore the defendant may be sentenced to death: a defendant is not truly
"eligible" for the death penalty . . . unless and until the jury makes the
determination that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators.... [T]he
range of penalties to which he is exposed does not include the death
penalty until the jury makes that required factual finding of this ele-
ment of the offense.269
Consequently, the panel held that "a jury's finding that the aggravat-
ing factors outweigh the mitigating factors is an element of the death pen-
alty and must be found beyond a reasonable doubt."270 Nevertheless, the
Gabrion panel's careful functional analysis was reversed on precisely this
issue upon en banc review by the entire Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.271
IV. THE CAPITAL JURY TODAY: HURST V. FLORIDA AND BEYOND
A. The Limits and Promise of Hurstfor Completing Ring
Remarkably, sixteen years after the Supreme Court's decision in
Ring, the Court still has not directly taken up the lingering issue of whether
266. Id. at 325-29.
267. Id. at 326.
268. Id. at 327 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)).
269. Id. Judge Reinhardt's opinion in Mitchell, dissenting from the Ninth Circuit panel's rejec-
tion of the defendant's claim that the FDPA weighing determination must be made "beyond a reason-
able doubt," reflects this same kind of thoughtful, careful, functional analysis. See United States v.
Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 1011-13 (2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("From this functional perspective,
there is no practical difference between the increase in punishment due to the finding of an aggravating
factor and the increase due to the finding that aggravators outweigh mitigators. Because the [FDPA]
requires both findings in order for a judge to sentence a defendant to death, the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to make these findings beyond a reasonable doubt.").
270. Gabrion, 648 F.3d at 325.
271. See Gabrion, 719 F.3d at 531-33. The en banc court's analysis was not functional, see supra
note 262 (quoting en banc opinion), and failed to discuss or even cite Ring. See Gabrion, 719 F.3d at
531-33. The court did note that the other six circuits that had addressed a claim that the FDPA's
weighing finding requires a beyond a reasonable doubt jury finding had all rejected it, and the en banc
court seemed quite pleased to announce: "Today we become the seventh." Id. at 533.
712 [Vol. 95:3
"FINDING" A WAY TO COMPLETE THE RING
the Sixth Amendment requires the involvement of a jury in the process of
death penalty decision-making, beyond the finding of an aggravating cir-
cumstance. It is hard to believe that forty-plus years into the age of the
modem death penalty, such a basic question as "who decides?" remains
unresolved, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's extensive regula-
tion of other aspects of capital sentencing (and even the minutia of some
aspects of capital sentencing).272 It is likewise remarkable that over thir-
teen years passed before the Supreme Court addressed the impact of its
Ring decision for Florida's "advisory jury" capital sentencing system (or
the similar one in Alabama), especially when, in terms of its structure,
Florida's very active capital sentencing system was still the same
judge-dominated and judge-determined system that the Court first ad-
dressed and upheld in 1976 in Proffitt (and then upheld again in Spaziano
and Hildwin).273 After all of the Ring Court's strong language about the
need for a jury to make the required finding of an aggravating circum-
stance in a capital case, for over thirteen years post-Ring, capital defend-
ants in Florida (and Alabama) continued to be sentenced to death based
upon a judge's finding of at least one aggravating circumstance, with only
an advisory role for the jury in this regard, in addition to a judge's finding
274regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
On January 12, 2016, in Hurst v. Florida, the Supreme Court finally
again took up (and this time struck down) Florida's capital sentencing
scheme.275 This time the vote was 8-1, with seven Justices on the majority
opinion; and the Court opinion by Justice Sotomayor was direct, concise,
and emphatic.2 76 Regarding Florida's capital sentencing system, the Hurst
Court declared: "We hold this sentencing scheme unconstitutional. The
Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary
to impose a sentence of death. A jury's mere recommendation is not
enough."277
The Hurst Court focused upon the actual content of Florida's statu-
tory provisions (as a proper Sixth Amendment elements-based analysis
should) and appeared to have little trouble concluding that its decisions in
Ring and Apprendi dictated that Florida's "advisory jury" capital sentenc-
ing scheme must be struck down-even though this also meant (finally)
272. See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 26, at 2-3.
273. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)-(3) (2015) (amended 2017); see also ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45
to -47 (2015).
274. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)-(3); ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45 to -47; see also supra notes
202-10 and accompanying text.
275. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).
276. Id. at 618. Justice Sotomayor's opinion for the Hurst Court was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan. Id. Justice Breyer concurred in
the judgment. Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Alito dissented. Id. at 624 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing).
277. Id. at 619 (majority opinion).
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explicitly overturning its decisions in Spaziano and Hildwin, which had
upheld precisely this system.
We now expressly overrule Spaziano and Hildwin in relevant part.
Spaziano and Hildwin summarized earlier precedent to conclude that
"the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings au-
thorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury."
Their conclusion was wrong, and irreconcilable with Apprendi.278
In other words, under Hurst, the Sixth Amendment does "require that
the specificfindings authorizing the imposition of [a] sentence of death be
made by [a] jury."279 Importantly, the Hurst Court here reaches back not
just to Ring, but to Apprendi's broader language about the "findings" that
authorize a death sentence (rather than merely the fact of an aggravator).
Thus, the Hurst Court declared-in broader language and with broader
potential consequences than in Ring-a full and complete break with the
Court's first twenty years of its modern capital sentencing (no jury needed)
jurisprudence. In the words of Justice Sotomayor: "Time and subsequent
cases have washed away the logic of Spaziano and Hildwin."280
Furthermore, while the narrow holding of Hurst, like that of Ring,
focuses upon the need for a jury to make the required finding of at least
one aggravating circumstances in a capital case,28' the Hurst Court's over-
all approach and language are significantly broader than in Ring and more
similar to that of Apprendi. Like Ring, the Hurst Court articulates and re-
lies upon the functional approach of Apprendi. In particular, Hurst sum-
marizes Apprendi as holding "that any fact that 'expose[s] the defendant
to a greater punishment han that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict' is
an 'element' that must be submitted to a jury."282 Thus, Hurst is explicitly
premised on the functional and elements-based approach of both Apprendi
and Ring. On the other hand, while the Hurst Court here and otherwise
refers to the finding of "facts" and "factfinding," the Hurst Court also re-
peatedly refers more generally to the "findings" that must be made during
a capital sentencing, and the Hurst opinion uses the terms "facts" and
"factfinding" interchangeably with the broader term "findings," within its
descriptions of the type of determination that must be made before a de-
fendant can be sentenced to death-much as the Apprendi Court had done
(but unlike Ring).
278. Id. at 623 (citation omitted) (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per
curiam)).
279. See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41).
280. Id. at 624.
281. See id. (noting that Spaziano and Hildwin "are overruled to the extent they allow a sentenc-
ing judge to find an aggravating circumstance, independent of a jury's factfinding, that is necessary
for imposition of the death penalty").
282. Id. at 621 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
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In its description of the Florida capital sentencing scheme, the Hurst
Court repeatedly refers to "findings," including when quoting Florida law,
which also used the term "findings" to refer to the type of determination
that had to be made within its capital system.28 3 And the Hurst Court
clearly recognized that a defendant could only be sentenced to death in
Florida (as in most other states) based upon multiple findings, not just a
single finding that an aggravating circumstance exists.284 As the Hurst
Court worked through applying the Apprendi/Ring functional "in-
crease-in-the-maximum-sentence" analysis to the Florida system, it noted
that the maximum sentence that a convicted first-degree murderer could
receive in Florida (based upon just the murder conviction) was life impris-
onment.285 The Hurst Court noted that such a person could receive a death
sentence "only if an additional sentencing proceeding 'results in findings
by the court that such person shall be punished by death."' 28 6 Although the
Florida system did use an advisory jury as part of its capital sentencing
scheme, this jury did not render any specific findings on aggravating cir-
cumstances or on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, but gave only an "advisory sentence" (based upon a majority vote)
of either death or imprisonment for life, without specifying the basis for
its recommendation.2 87
The Hurst Court emphasized that Florida's capital scheme did require
that certain findings be made before a defendant could be sentenced to
death but also that these findings had to be made by the trial judge (not the
advisory jury):
[T]he Florida sentencing statute does not make a defendant eligible for
death until "findings by the court that such person shall be punished
by death." The trial court alone must find "the facts . .. [t]hat sufficient
aggravating circumstances exist" and "[t]hat there are insufficient mit-
igating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances."
288
This quotation is significant because it exemplifies the Hurst Court's
recognition: (1) that a defendant is not "eligible" for the death penalty un-
der Florida law until multiple "findings" are made by the trial court, and
(2) that these required "findings" include both the existence of "sufficient
aggravating circumstances" (i.e., at least one) and that the mitigating cir-
cumstances in the case are "insufficient" to "outweigh" the aggravating
283. For example, the Hurst Court noted that under Florida law, "[i]f the court imposes death, it
must 'set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based."' Id. at 620 (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2010) (amended 2017)).
284. See id (noting that in Hurst the sentencing judge sentenced Hurst to death based on two
aggravating circumstances).
285. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)).
286. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)) (emphasis added).
287. Id. (summarizing Florida law).
288. Id. at 622 (citations omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(1), 921.141(3)).
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circumstances.28 9 This passage is also noteworthy because (while describ-
ing Florida law) it describes both of these findings as "facts." This suggests
that the weighing finding may actually already be covered by the "fact"
language of the holdings of both Ring and Hurst.2 9 0
This interpretation is further supported by the Hurst Court's applica-
tion of Ring to the case at issue, in which the Court clearly recognized that
multiple findings-not just a single finding about he existence of an ag-
gravating circumstance-are required as the basis for a death sentence.
The Hurst Court wrote:
Like Arizona at the time of Ring, Florida does not require the jury to
make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty. Ra-
ther, Florida requires a judge to find these facts .... It is true that in
Florida the jury recommends a sentence, but it does not make the spe-
cific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or ag-
gravating circumstances and its recommendation is not binding on the
trial judge."
29 1
And the Hurst Court summarized its application of Ring as follows: "As
with Timothy Ring, the maximum punishment Timothy Hurst could have
received without any judge-made findings was life in prison without pa-
role. As with Ring, a judge increased Hurst's authorized punishment based
on her own factfinding. In light of Ring, we hold that Hurst's sentence
violates the Sixth Amendment."292
The quotations provided in the preceding paragraph show the Hurst
Court using the terms "findings," "facts," "factual findings," and "fact-
finding" interchangeably in this context and using all of these terms to
apply to all the findings that are required for a death sentence, including
the weighing finding-rather than in a way that suggests that the finding
of an aggravator is a narrower "factual" finding, which may be unlike the
weighing finding (a possibility that was left open in Ring).
Consequently, although the Hurst Court does not actually address the
issue of whether, under the Sixth Amendment, a capital defendant has a
right to a jury finding regarding the "weighing" of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances, because the Court's analysis recognizes that all
289. See id.; see also id. at 620 (discussing Florida death penalty procedure). The Hurst Court
likewise quoted the following language from a decision by the Florida Supreme Court: "[T]he trial
court alone must make detailed findings about the existence and weight of aggravating circumstances;
it has no jury findings on which to rely." Id. at 622 (quoting State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 546 (Fla.
2005)).
290. See id. at 619 (holding that "[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find
each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death"); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (hold-
ing that capital defendants "are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature
conditions an increase in their maximum punishment").
291. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Walton v. Arizona,
497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)).
292. Id. (emphasis added).
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"findings" that are required for a death sentence under the law of the ju-
risdiction must be made by a jury and that both an aggravator finding and
a weighing finding are required for a death sentence in Florida, it logically
follows that the weighing finding, along with the finding of an aggravating
circumstance, must be made by a jury.293 Furthermore, under the Sixth
Amendment rule of Apprendi/Ring, this weighing finding must be made
"beyond a reasonable doubt."294
Justice Alito, the sole dissenter in Hurst, likewise recognized the de-
cision in broad terms and described Hurst as "holding that the Sixth
Amendment does require that the specific findings authorizing a sentence
of death be made by a jury." 2 95 Although Alito disagreed with this conclu-
sion, he recognized its broad scope, which he believed to be an unwise
"extension" of Ring.296
The conclusion of the Hurst opinion also reflects a more expansive
vision of the capital jury, invoking the idea of a right to a "jury's verdict"
in the death penalty context-arguably suggesting a right to have the jury
be the ultimate sentencer in a capital case-a suggestion that goes beyond
the more limited Sixth Amendment Apprendi/Ring right to a jury determi-
nation on all the "elements" that are required for a death sentence in the
jurisdiction at issue. The Hurst Court wrote: "The Sixth Amendment pro-
tects a defendant's right to an impartial jury. This right required Florida to
base Timothy Hurst's death sentence on ajury's verdict, not ajudge's fact-
finding." 2 9 7 The Court then concluded that Florida's sentencing scheme
"is therefore unconstitutional."298 Although the Hurst Court did not other-
wise suggest hat there is a constitutional right to a jury "verdict" on the
ultimate sentencing issue of whether a defendant is actually sentenced to
death, this expansive language is consistent with the broad language and
overall approach of the Hurst opinion, which does strongly suggest that
where a jurisdiction requires a weighing finding as a precondition for a
death sentence, this finding must be made by a jury and beyond a reason-
able doubt.
B. The Role of the Capital Jury Post-Hurst
Judicial and legislative responses to the Supreme Court's 2016 Hurst
decision among the death penalty states arguably affected by it have
293. It should be noted that this Sixth Amendment analysis always depends upon the actual con-
tent of the underlying statutory provisions at issue, i.e., the actual requirements for a death sentence in
the jurisdiction at issue.
294. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior convic-
tion, any fact that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
295. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 625 (Alito, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added).
296. Id. (arguing that "even if Ring is assumed to be correct," he "would not extend it," as the
majority does in Hurst).




ranged from enthusiastic implementation (or at least acquiescence) to de-
fiance (or at least inaction). Much of the silence/inaction is likely attribut-
able to the fact that "death penalty states" (defined herein as states that
currently have in place a statutory death penalty system)299 vary so widely
in terms of how often this penalty is actually sought or imposed.3 00 In ad-
dition, death penalty prosecutions nationally are currently at or near his-
toric lows for the modem era, and the number of actual executions in the
United States has dropped to the lowest level since the early 1990s.3 01 Con-
sequently, in the many states where death penalty prosecutions and execu-
tions are legal but rare, it is not surprising that Hurst has not sparked much
specific response.
Among the five hybrid states that did not have all-jury capital sen-
tencing at the time of Hurst-i.e., Florida, Alabama, Delaware, Montana,
and Nebraska-Montana and Nebraska seem to fall into this category.
While they continue to have their same judge-jury sentencing systems in
place, they are .not particularly "active" in the death penalty realm.30 2 Del-
aware, Florida, and Alabama, on the other hand, have all responded to
Hurst.
Delaware's Supreme Court was the first to address the impact of
Hurst on its hybrid capital sentencing system, and its ruling was quite stun-
ning. The Delaware Supreme Court declared, in a per curiam opinion, that
"Delaware's current death penalty statute violates the Sixth Amendment
role of the jury as set forth in Hurst."303 And by answering a series of
questions that had been certified to the court, it further declared that under
the Sixth Amendment, as applied to Delaware law: (1) a jury must "find"
the existence of an "aggravating circumstance"; (2) this "finding" must be
both unanimous and beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) a jury must "find"
"that the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating
circumstances found to exist"; and (4) this "finding" must be both unani-
mous and beyond a reasonable doubt.304 The court ruled that Delaware's
299. This Article includes in its definition of "death penalty states" states that continue to have
statutory death penalty schemes in place, even if they also have a governor-imposed moratorium on
executions. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited May 16, 2018) (listing
states with a gubernatorial moratorium).
300. See State by State Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenal-
tyinfo.org/state by state (last visited May 16, 2018) (providing a searchable database r garding state
death penalty imposition).
301. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2018),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
302. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2017) (trial judge decides whether there are "mitigat-
ing circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency," after a jury finds at least one aggravat-
ing circumstance); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520 to -2522 (2017) (following a jury finding of at least
one aggravating circumstance, three-judge panel evaluates mitigating evidence, makes various deter-
minations, and determines sentence). Montana and Nebraska have both executed three persons in the
modem era. See State by State Database, supra note 300 (select "Montana" from the "select a State"
dropdown menu); id (select "Nebraska" from the "Select a State" dropdown menu).
303. Raufv. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
304. Id. at 433-34.
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death penalty statute violated all four of these requirements and thus, was
"unconstitutional" for all of these reasons.30 s The court then struck down
Delaware's entire death penalty statute, declaring that it would be left up
to the Delaware General Assembly "whether to reinstate the death pen-
alty."306
Nearly two years later, the Delaware legislature has not reinstated the
death penalty.307 Thus, as a result of Hurst and the Delaware Supreme
Court's interpretation of Hurst, Delaware is no longer a death penalty
state.30s
Because Florida's capital sentencing scheme was struck down in
Hurst, the Florida legislature was forced to act, and it significantly
amended its capital statute in 2016.309 Under this revised statute, a jury is
required to find at least one "aggravating factor," unanimously and beyond
a reasonable doubt, in order for a defendant to be sentenced to death.310
The jury is also required to determine "[w]hether sufficient aggravating
factors exist" and "[w]hether aggravating factors exist which outweigh the
mitigating circumstances" before deciding whether or not to "recom-
mend[]" a death sentence-and ajudge may not impose a death sentence
without a jury recommendation of death.311 Thus, Florida no longer rele-
gates the jury to a merely advisory role, and it no longer allows for judicial
override of a jury's recommendation of a "non-death" sentence.3 12 On the
other hand, the 2016 revised statute allowed a trial judge to sentence a
defendant to death if at least ten of twelve jurors voted to recommend a
death sentence.313
In Hurst v. State,314 upon remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Florida Supreme Court evaluated the 2016 amended version of Florida's
death penalty statute under the Supreme Court's decision in Hurst.3 15 The
Florida Supreme Court interpreted Hurst broadly and recognized its ap-
plicability to all "findings" that are required for a death sentence:
The Supreme Court in Hurst v. Florida has now made clear that the
critical findings necessary for imposition of a sentence of death are the
sole province of the jury. And because these findings occupy a position
on par with elements of a greater offense, we conclude that all thef
305. Id.
306. Id. at 434.
307. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 299.
308. See id
309. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2016) (amended 2017)).
310. Id. § 921.141(2)(b).
311. Id. § 921.141(2)(b), (3)(a).
312. Compare id. (requiring jury recommendation of death in order for defendant to be sentenced
to death by trial court), with FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2015) (providing for "advisory" jury sentence that
does not limit the trial court's choice of actual sentence).
313. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(c), (3) (2016).
314. 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam).
315. Id. at 43-45.
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findings necessary for the imposition of a sentence of death must be
made by the jury ... 316
And the court ruled that in Florida, the "specific findings required to
be made by the jury include the existence of each aggravator factor ... ,
the finding that the aggravating factors are sufficient, and the finding that
the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances."317 Hence
the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the Ring rule applies to Florida's
required weighing finding and also to Florida's requirement that he ag-
gravators be "sufficient." And the Florida Supreme Court, like the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, used the term "finding" throughout its analysis.
But the Florida Supreme Court went even further and ruled, in an
expansive and wide-ranging opinion, that Florida's state constitution in-
cludes a requirement for unanimity in criminal jury verdicts and that in
capital cases this requirement of unanimity applies to all the findings that
must be made, including the jury's ultimate decision about whether to rec-
ommend a death sentence.319 Hence, notwithstanding all the improvements
in Florida's amended death penalty statute, the Florida Supreme Court
ruled, in a separate case that was decided the same day as Hurst v. State,
that the 2016 statute's allowance a death sentence based upon a non-unan-
320imous jury recommendation was unconstitutional. In 2017, the Florida
legislature responded by again amending its capital statute-this time to
require that the jury be unanimous in order to recommend a death sen-
tence.32 1
Unlike Delaware and Florida, the Alabama Supreme Court remained
completely unrepentant regarding the constitutionality of Alabama's
judge-jury capital system and its own post-Ring decisions upholding this
system. In Ex parte Bohannon,322 an 8-0 decision, with seven justices join-
ing the majority opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded: "Ring
and Hurst require only that the jury find the existence of the aggravating
factor that makes a defendant eligible for the death penalty-the plain lan-
guage in those cases requires nothing more and nothing less."323 The court
essentially pronounced that it found nothing new or significant in Hurst
and that "Hurst was based on an application, not an expansion, of Ap-
prendi and Ring."32 4 The court concluded: "Our reading ofApprendi, Ring,
316. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
317. Id. at 44.
318. See, e.g., id (noting that "specific findings" must "be made by the jury" in death penalty
sentencing).
319. Id. at 53-54.
320. Perry v. State, 210 So. 3d 630, 634 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam).
321. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(c) (2017).
322. 222 So. 3d 525 (Ala. 2016).
323. Id. at 532, 537.
324. Id. at 533.
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and Hurst leads us to the conclusion that Alabama's capital-sentencing
scheme is consistent with the Sixth Amendment."325
Nevertheless, in 2017 the Alabama legislature amended Alabama's
death penalty statute in some significant ways. Alabama law now provides
capital defendants with a right to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" jury find-
ing regarding the existence of at least one "aggravating circumstance"
(though a verdict of guilt on a capital offense that overlaps with an aggra-
vating circumstance is still considered an adequate jury finding in this re-
gard).326 In addition, Alabama capital defendants now have a right to insist
upon a jury finding that any aggravating circumstances in the case "out-
weigh the mitigating circumstances."3 2 7 Hence Alabama is no longer a hy-
brid state, in terms of allowing a judge to give a sentence different from
that of the jury, and Alabama judges can no longer override a jury's deci-
sion not to recommend a death sentence.328 On the other hand, Alabama
law does allow a defendant to be sentenced to death based upon a jury
recommendation of a death sentence by just ten of the twelve jurors.329
Consequently, although a jury finding on weighing is required, it need not
be unanimous, and there is no requirement in the statute that it be beyond
a reasonable doubt.330
Looking back, the impact of Hurst on the death penalty systems of
Delaware, Florida, and Alabama has been quite striking. The Supreme
Courts of Delaware and Florida interpreted Hurst broadly and as applying
to all the findings that are required for a death sentence in their particular
jurisdictions. Furthermore, despite the foot-dragging of the Alabama Su-
preme Court, the Alabama legislature has likewise implemented a rather
expansive vision of Ring/Hurst, which includes a right to a jury finding on
all the elements of a death sentence in that state, and which does not allow
a death sentence unless the jury (i.e., at least ten jurors on the jury) recom-
mends a death sentence.3 31
Consequently, in America today, every death penalty state (except
Montana and Nebraska) provides capital defendants with a statutory right
325. Id. at 532.
326. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45(e), -46(e)(3) (2017).
327. Id. § 13A-5-46(e)(2), (3).
328. See id. § 13A-5-47(a) ("Where the jury has returned a verdict of death, the court shall sen-
tence the defendant to death. Where a sentence of death is not returned by the jury, the court shall
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole.").
329. Id. § 13A-5-46(f) ("The decision of the jury to recommend a sentence of death must be
based on a vote of at least [ten] jurors."); see also ALA. R. CRIM. P. 18.4(f) (specifying the number of
people on a jury).
330. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)-(f).
331. See id §§ 13A-5-45(e), -46(e)-(f). Alabama's willingness to allow a death sentence based
upon the recommendation often of twelve jurors makes Alabama the only state that still allows a death
sentence based upon a non-unanimous jury recommendation. Life Verdict or Hung Jury? How States
Treat Non-Unanimous Jury Votes in Capital-Sentencing Proceedings, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/Non-Unanimous-Jury-Votes-in-Capital-Sentencing-Pro-
ceedings.
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to insist that the findings required for a sentence of death be made by a
jury. Furthermore, every death penalty state (except Montana and Ne-
braska) places the ultimate death penalty decision in the hands of the jury
rather than a judge.3 32 While in some states a judge can impose a lesser
sentence than the jury recommends, in America today a judge may not
impose a sentence of death when a jury has recommended a sentence of
life. 333
The main lingering issue in America today regarding completion of
the Ring revolution is whether the Ring rule mandates that any required
weighing finding (and any other required finding in the jurisdiction at is-
sue) must be made "beyond a reasonable doubt." Despite the Supreme
Court's failure to require a weighing finding for a valid death sentence, the
majority of death penalty states in America today do require that before a
defendant can be sentenced to death, the decisionmaker must make some
type of finding that the aggravating circumstances in the case "outweigh"
(or are not outweighed by) the mitigating circumstances in the case.334 Out
332. Life Verdict or Hung Jury? How States Treat Non-Unanimous Jury Votes in Capital-Sen-
tencing Proceedings, supra note 331. Although in many states the jury's ultimate sentencing decision
is described as a "recommendation," as of the summer of 2017, there are no longer any states in which
a trial judge is allowed to "override" a jury recommendation of "not death," i.e., some form of impris-
onment, with a sentence of death. See Alabama Abolishes Judge Override in Death Penalty Cases,
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 4, 2017), https://eji.org/news/alabama-legislature-passes-law-abolish-
ing-judicial-override (noting that Alabama abolished judicial override in death penalty cases, becom-
ing the final state to abolish the practice).
333. See Alabama Abolishes Judge Override in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 332.
334. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(2) (no death penalty unless jury "determines" that any ag-
gravating circumstances "outweigh the mitigating circumstances"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(2)
(2017) (no death penalty unless jury finds that "[a]ggravating circumstances outweigh beyond a rea-
sonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found to exist"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 2017)
(no death penalty unless jury "concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(b)(II) (2017) (no death penalty unless jury
"unanimously finds and specifies in writing that ... [t]here are insufficient mitigating factors to out-
weigh the aggravator factor or factors that were proved"); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(b)(2)(b) (2017)
(no death penalty unless jury finds that "aggravating factors exist which outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances found to exist"); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(I)(l)-(2) (2017) (death sentence requires that
jury "find that . .. any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circum-
stance or circumstances"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6617(e) (2017) (no death penalty unless "the jury
finds beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not out-
weighed by any mitigating circumstances"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(3)(c) (2017) (death sen-
tence requires that jury "find . . . [t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances . . . to outweigh
the aggravating circumstances"); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030(4)(3) (2017) (no death penalty if the jury
"concludes that there is evidence in mitigation of punishment, . . . which is sufficient to outweigh the
evidence in aggravation of punishment"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522(2) (2017) (death sentence re-
quires "determination" by three-judge panel "[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist
which approach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circumstances"); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 175.554(3) (2017) (no death sentence unless jury "finds that there are no mitigating circumstances
sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:05(IV) (2017) (no death sentence unless "the jury concludes that the aggravating factors out-
weigh the mitigating factors"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(3) (2017) (death sentence requires
"finding[]" by jury "[t]hat the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1)
(West 2017) (no death penalty unless prosecution establishes "by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the aggravating circumstances the defendant was found guilty of committing are sufficient to
outweigh the factors in mitigation"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (2017) (no death penalty "if it is
found [by the jury] that any such aggravating circumstances [are] outweighed by the finding of one or
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of the current thirty-one death penalty states in America, eighteen (58%)
require a weighing finding.335 And an additional five death penalty states
require some type of finding that despite the mitigating circumstances in
the case, the defendant "deserves" a death sentence.336 Thus, twenty-three
out of America's thirty-one current death penalty states (over 74%) require
a weighing finding or some similar "deserves-a-death-sentence" finding
before a capital defendant can be sentenced to death.337 The other eight
capital states only require that jurors "consider" mitigating evidence, with-
out requiring any particular findings in this regard.
On the other hand, of the twenty-three states that require a weighing
or some kind of "deserves death" finding, only six states statutorily man-
date that this required finding be made "beyond a reasonable doubt."33 9
Hence only 26% (six of twenty-three) of the states that require such a find-
ing also require that it be made beyond a reasonable doubt.34 0 Thus, while
nearly 75% of death penalty states do require a weighing or similar find-
ing, almost 75% of these states do not require that it be made beyond a
reasonable doubt.341
more mitigating circumstances"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 971 l(c)(1)(iv) (2017) (no death sentence un-
less "the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigat-
ing circumstances"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f)(2) (2017) (no death penalty unless prosecution
proves that any "aggravating circumstance(s] ... outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(5)(b) (West 2017) (no death pen-
alty unless "the jury is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total
mitigation").
335. See supra note 334.
336. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(E) (2017) (no death penalty unless the jury "deter-
mines that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency"); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2515(3)(b), (8)(a)(ii) (2017) (jury must make finding "whether all mitigating circum-
stances, when weighed against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling [such] that
the death penalty would be unjust"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2017) (death sentence requires
that trial court "find[] that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(e)(1) (West 2017) (death sentence requires
unanimous jury finding that there is not "a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to
warrant ... a sentence of life imprisonment without parole rather than a death sentence"); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 10.95.060(4), .080(2) (2017) (no death penalty unless jury is unanimously "convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency"). The
Idaho statute, as quoted herein, contains both weighing language and language about whether a death
sentence would be "unjust." IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(3)(b), (8)(a)(ii). Because the idea of "justice"
seems to be primary in the statute, Idaho is included within the "deserves-a-death-sentence" states
listed here.
337. See supra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.
338. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2) (West 2017);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(l)(c) (2017); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (2017); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.4(A)-(B) (2017); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(d)(iii) (2017).
339. These states are Arkansas, Kansas, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington; and among
these six states, the finding at issue is a weighing finding for all but Washington. See supra notes 333
and 335.
340. See supra notes 334 and 336.
341. See supra notes 334 and 336.
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This analysis suggests that there is a substantial amount of work left
to do in terms of completing the Ring revolution, by ensuring that all find-
ings that are required for a death sentence be made by a jury and beyond
a reasonable doubt. In addition, this analysis also reveals a limitation of
the Sixth Amendment approach. The eight "consider" states, which do not
require any particular post-aggravator findings, are not covered by this Ar-
ticle's Sixth Amendment approach because the extent of the Sixth Amend-
ment's reach (as addressed herein) is based upon the content of the under-
lying law of the jurisdiction at issue. And these eight states do not require
any specific death penalty findings other than the existence of at least one
aggravating circumstance (or a functional equivalent).34 2
Nevertheless, as shown by the very significant changes that Hurst has
inspired in the death penalty schemes of Delaware, Florida, and Ala-
bama-including abolition of the death penalty in Delaware-the Sixth
Amendment approach of Apprendi/Ring/Hurst is powerful indeed. In ad-
dition, this Sixth Amendment approach, if taken to its logical and legal end
in this realm--by applying it to all required death penalty findings-has
the very significant advantage (over any potential Eighth Amendment ap-
proach) of being mandatory under the existing decisions of Apprendi,
Ring, and Hurst.343 In addition, as shown by shown by the 8-1 vote in
Hurst, with seven Justices on the majority opinion, the basic Sixth Amend-
ment approach has already acquired broad agreement among the Justices
on the U.S. Supreme Court.34 4 The Sixth Amendment approach has al-
ready had significant impact upon the states in this realm, and this impact
seems likely to continue to expand.
CONCLUSION
In In re Winship,345 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process includes the right not to be convicted of
a crime "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt."346 The Court
wrote:
No man should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless
the jurors who try him are able, upon their consciences, to say that the
evidence before them . . . is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable
342. See supra note 338.
343. Although the Supreme Court still has not directly addressed the applicability of the Ap-
prendi/Ring rule to the weighing finding, Justices Sotomayor and Breyer have indicated that they have
concluded that the Sixth Amendment does extend this far. See, e.g., Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S.
Ct. 405, 405, 410-11 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of cert. review) (concluding that
because Alabama's capital weighing finding is "necessary to impose the death penalty" in that state,
"[u]nder Apprendi and Ring, [this] finding ... must be made by a jury").
344. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 618-19 (2016). Among the Court's current member-
ship, six were part of the majority opinion in Hurst. See id. In particular, Justice Sotomayor's Hurst
majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Kagan. Id.
345. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
346. Id. at 364.
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doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged.347
In America today, no capital defendant should be deprived of life unless
the jurors who try and sentence that defendant are able, upon their con-
sciences, to declare that every finding that is necessary for a death sentence
has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Sixth Amendment rule of Apprendi/Ring/Hurst requires this re-
sult. No defendant can be constitutionally sentenced to death in America
unless a jury finds that every element that is required by law for a death
sentence has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. When it comes
to all of the required findings for a death sentence-including any finding
regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances-the
jury must be the decisionmaker, and the standard must be "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." In this matter of life and death, the jury must decide, and
the jury must be sure.
347. Id. at 363 (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486 (1895)).
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